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Introduction
The United States embodies democratic principles founded on Judeo-
Christian ideologies and sculpted by our founding fathers. The norms of
our democracy have always permitted, and perhaps even encouraged,
Americans to elect leaders they perceive as sharing their own religious
moral ideals and as developing policies and laws that centrally feature their
values.' During the past several decades, candidates for the presidency
and Congress increasingly have been elected largely as a result of the
orchestrated support of particular religious groups. 2 As our "American
Theocracy ' 3 has evolved, consistent with the suggestion that Americans
have a proclivity for exporting their personal moral virtuosity,4 these
elected politicians intentionally have inculcated foreign policy and foreign
assistance policy with their own religious moral values. 5 Unfortunately,
sometimes such designs can be fundamentally and unabashedly
problematic. 6
A powerful vehicle through which a policymaker can inject morality
into international affairs is the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), 7 the government agency primarily responsible for distributing
U.S. funds to foreign countries in furtherance of the U.S. government's for-
1. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
24-34 (2003) (arguing that legislative reference to religious morals is acceptable); Susan
Pace Hammill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 671, 677 (2006) (discussing Americans' reliance on religious views when mak-
ing political decisions). In fact, the elected official may or may not share the moral
values of the majority of his or her supporters.
2. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERiCAN THEOCRACY 124, 185-204 (2006); JOHN C.
GREEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: A BASELINE
FOR 2004 3-16, http://www.pewforum.org/publications/surveys/green-full.pdf [herein-
after POLITICAL ATTITUDES].
3. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at viii (explaining that the book title captures "a potent
change in this country's domestic and foreign policy making-religion's new political
prowess"); see JOHN C. GREEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE AND THE 2004
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: INCREASED POLARIZATION (2005), http://www.pewforum.org/publica-
tions/surveys/postelection.pdf (discussing voting trends of religious sects); POLITICAL
ATTITUDES, supra note 2, at 1-40 (discussing political patterns within religious sects).
4. See Ernest W. Lefever, Morality Versus Moralism in Foreign Policy, in ETHICS AND
WORLD POLITICS: FOUR PERSPECTIVES 11 (Ernest W. Lefever ed., 1988).
5. See generally PETER SINGER, THE PRESIDENT OF GOOD & EVIL: THE ETHICS OF
GEORGE W. BUSH 34-211 (2004) (discussing President Bush's policies in light of his
religious and moral beliefs); Leo P. Ribuffo, Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy,
in THE INFLUENCE OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1, 7-21 (Elliott
Abrams ed., 2001).
6. See generally Arthur Schlesinger, National Interests and Moral Absolutes, in ETHICS
AND WORLD POLITICS: FOUR PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 21 (describing the problematic
relationship between morality and international politics).
7. International developmental aid also is made available through the U.S. Depart-
ment of State. See Michael M. Phillips & David Rogers, Battle Over Foreign-Aid Spending
Heats Up, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006, at A4. Recently, President George W. Bush
announced his plan to consolidate foreign assistance programs under the Department of
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eign policy objectives.8 These goals are inextricably identified with, and
guided by, the pursuit of "national interest."9 Although the U.S. Constitu-
tion provides Congress and the president shared powers over foreign
affairs, for many years the two branches have contended for foreign policy
primacy. 10 In recent years, the president has been the dominant actor in
setting national objectives with regard to the international sphere." Agen-
cies such as the U.S. Department of State and USAID make available funds
that Congress appropriates for governmental initiatives promoting national
interests.'2 USAID's role in this regard "has always had the twofold pur-
pose of ... expanding democracy and free markets while improving the
lives of the citizens of the developing world.' 1 3 Therefore, when our
elected policymakers formulate foreign policy and allocate funds to these
agencies for its effectuation, their priorities must be entirely consistent
with, and fully supportive of, these core national interests.
As a general matter, U.S. foreign aid historically "has never been an
unconditional transfer of financial resources."'14 Rather, the United States
usually provides assistance subject to conditions and policies intended
directly to serve national interests. 15 Thus, U.S. foreign aid provided
through USAID may attach conditions that ensure use of the resources
exclusively for advancing the spread and stability of political democracies
and free markets, or for enhancing the health, education, and economic
well-being of populations in developing countries. 16
Nonetheless, the policy restrictions attached to some U.S. foreign
State. See id. The plan has been criticized as an attempt to shift power from Congress to
the Executive Branch to determine aid priorities and recipients. See id.
8. U.S. foreign aid has long been considered an instrument or tool of U.S. foreign
policy. See, e.g., CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FOREIGN
AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 2 (2004) (describing
U.S. foreign aid as a flexible means of promoting national interests, projecting U.S. val-
ues, solving problems, and influencing events through a "carrot and stick" approach);
TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM (1971) (discussing the imperialistic impact that inter-
national organizations, such as the World Bank, have on developing countries). Theoret-
ically, U.S. foreign assistance is a strategy that also can be viewed as a part of U.S.
foreign policy. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Speech on the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America at the White House (Sept. 17, 2002), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html (drawing together materials showing U.S.
funding as foreign policy strategy).
9. For a discussion of the concept of national interest, see infra Part II.
10. See NinaJ. Crimm, Toward Facilitating a Voice for Politically Marginalized Minori-
ties and Enhancing Presidential Public Accountability and Transparency in Foreign Health
Policy-Making, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1053, 1080 (2006).
11. See id. at 1081.
12. See id. at 1075.
13. This Is USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2007).
USAID envisions these purposes as interconnected. See generally USAID, FOREIGN AID IN
THE NATIONAL INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY (2002). To
improve citizens' lives, USAID perceives good healthcare, education, and economic
opportunities as essential. See TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 8, at CRS-2.
14. HAYTER, supra note 8, at 15.
15. See id.
16. See TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 8, at CRS-2 (commenting on USAID's
objectives).
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assistance go beyond a direct tie to furthering national interests.1 7 One
particular example is the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global Gag
Rule (GGR), which constrains USAID international development assistance
for family planning. 18 Despite USAID's stated objectives and benefits of its
family planning program, 19 the GGR specifically prohibits foreign nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) from utilizing not just U.S. government
funds but also their own money to provide abortion counseling to women,
to lobby for or against legalized abortions, and to facilitate or offer abor-
tions for women. 20 These proscriptions have had enormous spillover
effects on the ability of foreign NGOs to provide health services to a wide
range of males and females. 2 1
In developing countries, the GGR has controlled operations of foreign
NGOs 22 and has oppressed women by controlling and restricting their
access to information and health care. 23 The reach of the GGR, however,
has leaked beyond family planning programs and has adversely impacted a
far wider range of health programs and human rights initiatives in which
foreign NGOs have engaged. 2 4 For example, the GGR has affected African
17. See, e.g., HAYTER, supra note 8 (suggesting that aid often becomes subterfuge for
imperialistic foreign policy strategies).
18. See generally POPULATION ACTION INT'L, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
MEXICO CITY POLICY RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. FAMILY PLANNING ASSISTANCE (2006), available
at http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/GlobalGagRuleRestric-
tions/GlobalGagRule.pdf (account of GGR and USAID family planning assistance) [here-
inafter WHAT You NEED TO KNOW].
19. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2000). The GGR applies to funding, technical assis-
tance, fellowships, and commodities, such as contraceptives and condoms. See generally
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW, supra note 18 (discussing effects of GGR on family planning
programs). According to USAID's website, the objectives and benefits of its family plan-
ning program are:
Enabling couples to determine whether, when, and how often to have children is
vital to safe motherhood and healthy families. Voluntary family planning has
profound health, economic, and social benefits for families and communities:
* Protecting the health of women by reducing high-risk pregnancies
* Protecting the health of children by allowing sufficient time between
pregnancies
* Fighting HIV/AIDS through providing information, counseling, and access to
male and female condoms
* Reducing abortions
* Supporting women's rights and opportunities for education, employment,
and full participation in society
* Protecting the environment by stabilizing population growth
Family Planning, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/globalhealth/pop/index.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2007).
20. WHAT You NEED TO KNOW, supra note 18, at 5-8.
21. See id.
22. This Article refers to foreign NGOs as those nonprofit organizations organized
and operating abroad, inlcuding domestic NGOs and NGOs with international scope.
23. WHAT You NEED TO KNOW, supra note 18.
24. The GGR has precluded domestic and international NGOs from forming alli-
ances with strategic foreign NGOs in countries affected by the GGR. See Mexico City
Policy: Effect of Restrictions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Mexico City Policy Hearing] (testimony of Aryeh Neier, Presi-
dent of the Open Society Institute). It has impacted the availability overseas of condoms
for the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. See Susan A.
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and Middle East NGOs and their projects seeking to eliminate female geni-
tal cutting,25 distribute condoms, counsel individuals about safe sex, and
offer other efforts to prevent and eradicate HIV/AIDS.2 6 This policy also
has curtailed programs to maintain health clinics with broad ranges of
medical services, including some that enable individuals to establish
healthy pregnancies important for infant, child, and maternal health. 27
Public opinions about each of these particular health and human rights
matters, independent of the GGR, are highly charged. Public views about
the GGR may be even more emotional, opinionated, and thorny because
the rule elicits reactions, often religiously-based, about morality, abortion,
women's rights to self-determination and dignity, NGOs' rights to freedom
of speech and association, and NGOs' abilities to deliver essential health
services. 28
This Article focuses on the GGR's grave harm to U.S. national inter-
ests. It suggests that the injury particularly is unwarranted because the
GGR is purely a product of the legislation of personal morals by U.S. presi-
dents (and a few congressional members) out of political and spiritual self-
interest. 29 Moreover, these politicians intentionally are forcing restraints
on foreign NGOs that not only are not in our national interest but also
likely would be unconstitutional if imposed on domestic NGOs.30 The
Cohen, The Global Contraceptive Shortfall: U.S. Contributions and U.S. Hindrances, 9
GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 15, 15-17 (Spring 2006).
25. See, e.g., Shawn Rhea, Firsthand Views Say Global Gag Rule is Taking Toll, COURIER
POST ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.courierpostonline.com/columnists/
cxrh022005a.htm; Marianne Sarkis, Female Genital Cutting (FGC): An Introduction,
FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING EDUC. & NETWORKING PROJECT, www.fgmnetwork.org/intro/
fgmintro.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2007). USAID uses the less emotionally charged term
"female genital cutting" to encompass female circumcision, female genital mutilation,
female genital cutting, and female genital surgeries. USAID, USAID POLICY ON FEMALE
GENITAL CUTTING (FGC) 4 (2000), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/
200mac.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Br. Mem. to the Sec'y of State from Arthur E. Dewey, Bureau of Popula-
tion, Refugees, and Migration, Your Meeting with the President Regarding the Mexico
City Policy and U.S. Funding for AIDS Assistance (Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Dewey
Memorandum]; POPULATION ACTION INT'L, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE GLOBAL
GAG RULE AND U.S. HIV/AIDS ASSISTANCE 4 (2004), available at http://www.population
action.org/Publications/Reports/Global Gag_Rule andUSHIV AIDSAssistance/
The GlobalGag.Rule-and-U.S. HIV-AIDSAssistance.pdf; Allegra Jones, Note, The
Mexico City Policy and Its Effects on HIV/AIDS Services in Sub-Saharan Africa, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD LJ. 187, 189-192 (2004); Kira Cochrane, Bush's War on Women, NEW
STATESMAN, Jan. 29, 2007; Basu Rekha, Ethiopia: Women Struggle, But Strings Bind US
Help, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 29, 2006, at 1A; How the Global Gag Rule Undermines U.S.
Foreign Policy & Harms Women's Health, FACT SHEET (Population Action Int'l, Wash.,
D.C.), June 2004, available at http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact-
Sheets/FS5/Summary.shtml [hereinafter POPULATION ACTION FACTSHEET]; Extending the
Global Gag Rule, OPEN SOC'Y INST., Feb. 26, 2003, http://www.soros.org/initiatives/
washington/news/globalgag_20030226.
27. See, e.g., Mexico City Policy Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Dr. Nirmal K.
Bista).
28. See Dewey Memorandum, supra note 26; Rekha, supra note 26, at IA.
29. See infra Part II (discussing the self-interested stances of past and present
administrations).
30. See POPULATION ACTION FACTSHEET, supra note 26.
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U.S. Constitution embodies freedom of speech and association as overrid-
ing values that must be guaranteed.3 1 These fundamental principles are
not just inconvenient technicalities of the Constitution to be accommo-
dated. If we truly believe in the basic constitutional rights of free speech
and association, we should want to promote them worldwide rather than to
evade them outside our territorial boundaries.
Part I introduces the emergence and evolution of the GGR. This por-
tion of the Article explores the self-interests of key actors and their religious
convictions that were vital in the creation of the GGR. Part II begins with a
brief discussion of foreign policy scholars' perspectives on the concept of
"national interest." It then suggests that the GGR is not primarily a vehicle
that serves national interests but rather an incompatible product of the
moral and political self-interests of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George
W. Bush. This section also reviews a variety of grave harms and injustices
generated by the GGR that are contrary to our collective national interests.
Among the problems discussed are unsatisfactory global public health con-
ditions, injustices to women, and the negative image of our country abroad.
This image arises in part from charges that the U.S. is a hypocritical
democracy. 3 2 Part III presents the possibility that as governmental regula-
tion that co-opts foreign women's bodies for the self-interests of certain
politicians, the GGR particularly discriminates against women and, if
applied to U.S. women, possibly would be unconstitutional under equal
protection principles. Part IV focuses on how the GGR restrictions
imposed on foreign NGOs likely would not be constitutional if applied to
domestic NGOs in the same position. The Article concludes that the GGR
as a foreign assistance policy decision is a source of tremendous harm to
the personal lives of residents of developing countries, has caused major
international public health problems, has resulted in significant detriment
to America's national interests, and is contrary to our basic notions of dem-
ocratic processes and our fundamental constitutional values. It suggests
that the Senate and House of Representatives, with their new Democratic
majorities, should work together to enact legislation to nullify the GGR.
I. Key Political Actors and the Emergence and Evolution of the Global
Gag Rule: 1960s-2006
A. The 1960s
After approximately eight "silent decades," abortion emerged in the
early 1960s as a public issue for Americans. 33 Its appearance was partially
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See Paula Tavrow, Undermining the AIDS Fight, BAIT. SUN, Oct. 18, 2005, at 15A.
33. During the early years of our nation, no state had laws proscribing abortion. See
JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA vii (1978). Until the mid-nineteenth century,
Americans seldom publicly discussed the topic. See JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS
A PERSON?: A COMPARISON OF POLICIES ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 23, 27 (2000). By the
mid-1800s, abortion had become a not uncommon medical procedure and disparate,
limited clusters of individuals-physicians, feminists, anti-vice proponents, and others-
with their own distinct financial, political, and social interests united in efforts to
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the result of women's and physicians' open acknowledgement of the years
of tragic pain and death endured as a result of numerous unsanitary and
dangerous abortions performed illegally due to rigid state statutes banning
abortion. 34 At the same time, the media highly publicized thalidomide and
German measles epidemic cases that resulted in the birth of deformed
infants because of the inability of women to obtain legal abortions.35
These tragedies fueled public discourse and increased sentiment to liber-
alize abortion laws. 3 6 Additionally, American social scientists and econo-
mists began to openly debate and urge attention to global population
issues. 37 Their concerns included the potential worldwide impact of a
criminalize abortion. See id. at 27-29. In other words, the driving force to ban abortion
was not widespread public opinion. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS AND THE
COURTS: ROE V. WADE AND ITS AFTERMATH 14 (1982).
By the early twentieth century, every state had enacted statutes banning abortion. See
MOHR, supra, at vii; SCHROEDEL, supra, at 29. As a result of concerted efforts to "educate"
the public on reasons to accept and embrace the new laws, public sentiment broadened
its support. See MOHR, supra, at 171-199; SCHROEDEL, supra, at 29. Many physicians,
who had willingly performed abortions before the anti-abortion statutes, readily
abstained from undertaking the operations but not because of ethical considerations.
See SCHROEDEL, supra, at 30. Judges and juries unhesitatingly convicted those who vio-
lated the abortion laws. See RUBIN, supra, at 14. Despite these changes, women of all
economic groups, but perhaps especially the poor, sought illegal abortions for eco-
nomic, health, and pregnancy-spacing reasons. See id. at 14-15.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, as many as 1.2 to 1.3 million illegal abortions
were performed annually in the United States, with an estimated 5,000 each year ending
in the pregnant woman's death. See RUIj1N, supra, at 15; Rickie Solinger, Chronology of
Abortion Politics, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000 xi (Rickie
Solinger ed., 1998).
34. See RAYMOND TATALOVICH & BYRON W. DAYNES, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION: A
STUDY OF COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 1 (1981). Social activist
groups, such as the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws, founded in 1969,
and the more conservative physician's group, the American Medical Association, were at
the vanguard of change. See id. at 35, 51-62.
35. Although the thalidomide tragedies were far greater in Europe than the United
States, one case, that of Sherri Finkbine, an American actress, was highly publicized.
Ms. Finkbine had taken thalidomide that she had obtained in Europe and then
attempted to obtain an abortion in her home state of Arizona. See RUBIN, supra note 33,
at 20-21. She was refused an abortion, and after unsuccessfully fighting the refusal in
the courts, she was forced to travel to Sweden to obtain an abortion. See id. at 20-21;
TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 44-46. In the German measles epidemic of
1962-1965, approximately 15,000 babies with deformities were born to women, many
of whom were denied abortions. See RUBIN, supra note 33, at 21-22. In 1967, three
states broke the rigid ban on abortion and legalized therapeutic abortions. TATALOVICH
& DAYNES, supra note 34, at 9.
36. See RUBIN, supra note 33, at 21-22.
37. Although the population explosion was perceived as most imminent and danger-
ous in underdeveloped countries, it was not viewed as confined only to them. Harold F.
Dorn, World Population Growth, in THE POPULATION DILEMMA 7, 7-28 (Philip M. Hauser
ed., 1963); Irene B. Taeuber, Population Growth in Underdeveloped Areas, in THE POPULA-
TION DILEMMA, supra, at 29, 29-45. The United States had experienced rapid population
growth since World War II, which led to concerns that America's resources and, there-
fore, Americans' standard of living and way of life would be threatened. See Donald J.
Bogue, Population Growth in the United States, in THE POPULATION DILEMMA, supra, at 70,
70-93; Joseph L. Fisher & Neal Potter, Resources in the United States and the World, in
THE POPULATION DILEMMA, supra, at 94, 94-103.
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population explosion, particularly as a result of the high fertility rates of
economically disadvantaged women, a decline in death rates, unease with
countries' food supplies and other resources, the lack of economic self-
sufficiency and development of underdeveloped and developing countries,
the potential peril to standards of living, potential immigration patterns,
and political forces. 3 8
As attention focused on global population issues, the United States'
Cold War mentality and general ambivalence toward providing foreign
assistance began to disintegrate. 39 Early in his term, President John F.
Kennedy, in a special address to Congress, described U.S. aid concepts as
"largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our needs and for the needs of the
underdeveloped world,"40 and U.S. foreign aid programs as "[b]ureau-
cratically fragmented, awkward and slow . . . obsolete, inconsistent and
unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes."4 1 He
considered it a priority for U.S. national interests to reach beyond U.S. bor-
ders and to address the worldwide population explosion because "[tihe
economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations which now
stand poised between sustained growth and economic chaos would be dis-
astrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity
and offensive to our conscience." 42 He further asserted that moral princi-
ples, world peace, and security require that "our new [foreign aid] program
should not be based merely on reaction to communist threats or short-term
crises," and that "[wie have a positive interest in helping less-developed
nations provide decent living standards for their people and achieve suffi-
cient strength, self-respect and independence to become self-reliant mem-
bers of the community of nations."43 President Kennedy successfully
38. See PAUL ERLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968); AnsleyJ. Coale, Population and
Economic Development, in THE POPULATION DILEMMA, supra note 37, at 46-69; Fisher &
Potter, supra note 37, at 94-124; Taeuber, supra note 37, at 29-45; Michael S. Teitel-
baum, The Population Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93, at 63, 65-67 (remarking
on the 1950s-1960s roles of John D. Rockefeller, IIl and economist-demographer Frank
Notestein in urging attention to high fertility and declining mortality, establishing the
Population Council, and persuading policymakers in President John F. Kennedy's
administration of the need for attention to global population issues).
39. See, e.g., USAID History, http://ww-w.usaid.gov/about-usaid/usaidhist.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2007).
40. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, 1 PUB. PAPERS 203 (Mar. 22,
1961).
41. Id. at 203-204.
42. Id. at 203. President Kennedy suggested that "the fundamental task of our for-
eign aid program in the 1960's is not negatively to fight Communism: Its fundamental
task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, as in the
nineteenth... economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand." Id.
at 205.
Neither President Kennedy's adherence to Catholicism nor the opposition of the Cath-
olic Church prevented President Kennedy and members of his administration from com-
mencing the first U.S. foreign policy initiatives regarding world population issues. See
Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 67.
43. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, supra note 40, at 208.
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encouraged Congress to enact the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA). 44
One part of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. § 2151b, authorized research on interna-
tional family planning and empowered the president to devise foreign pol-
icy on global population issues and health programs. 45
With the change of administration to President Lyndon B. Johnson,
U.S. foreign aid policy closely mirrored that of President Kennedy. 46 Presi-
dent Johnson expressed a strong commitment to have U.S. foreign assis-
tance programs "yield the greatest benefit to our country and to the free
world."'4 7 He backed international family planning initiatives and popula-
tion assistance through the FAA-authorized USAID. 48 As during the Ken-
nedy administration, President Johnson recognized the long-term benefits
to our nation of helping to reduce the "incessant cycle of hunger, ignorance
and disease . . . [as] the common blight of the developing world," and he
urged, "this vicious pattern can be broken. It must be broken if democracy
is to survive."4 9 To this end, women (and couples) must be given the
44. Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961). On signing the FAA on September 4,
1961, President Kennedy stated that "[tihe long-term commitment of development
funds, which the bill authorizes, will assist the under-developed countries of the world to
take the critical steps essential to economic and social progress." Statement by the Presi-
dent upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 588 (Sept. 4, 1961). These
objectives are reflected in Congress' goals in enacting the FAA: international family plan-
ning to accomplish stabilization of economies, education, health, food supplies, quality
of life, and self-reliance, especially in developing and underdeveloped countries. Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, §§ 101-02, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
45. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b (2000). The concept of family planning dates from antiquity.
Its objective is to enable individuals to foster their well-being and that of all family mem-
bers through reproductive choice and self-determination. "The ethics of its practice is
that of full information ... and the making of a free and uncoerced, honest and respon-
sible decision .... M.C. Asuzu, Family Planning, Contraception and Natural Family
Planning: What Place for Imperialism?, in FAMILY PLANNING, BIRTH CONTROL, AND WEST-
ERN IMPERIALISM 8 (1992). This notion contrasts with population control, which is a pro-
gram to achieve certain population patterns, distributions, or rates. Id. Population
control programs can disregard the objectives of family planning and operate as a
restriction on individuals' opportunities for freedom of reproductive choices. Id.
46. The Kennedy Legend & the Johnson Performance, TIME, Nov. 26, 1965, 30 30-31,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 17 1,834704,00.html.
47. Statement by the President upon Appointing a Committee to Review Foreign Aid
Programs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 84 (Dec. 26, 1963).
48. President Johnson and World Bank President Robert McNamara, among other
world leaders, considered the population explosion one of the most serious world
problems of the time. See Steven W. Sinding et al., Seeking Common Ground: Unmet
Need and Demographic Goals, 20 INT'L. FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 23, 23 (1994).
In 1965, USAID initiated population and reproductive health grants and programs.
See Ruth Dixon-Mueller, U.S. International Population Policy and the "Woman Question,"
20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 143, 150 (1987). In 1968, Congress funded family planning
programs and USAID started purchasing contraceptives for distribution to developing
countries. See LARRY NOWELS & CONNIE VEILLETTE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, INTERNA-
TIONAL POPULATION ASSISTANCE AND FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2
(2006).
49. Special Message to the Congress on the Foreign Aid Program, 1 PUB. PAPERS 117,
118 (Feb. 1, 1966). President Johnson repeated this sentiment on numerous occasions.
See, e.g., Statement by the President upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 978, 978 (Sept. 6, 1965).
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means to voluntarily exercise control over their fertility. 50
In 1969, the UnitedStates successfully spearheaded an initiative to cre-
ate the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). 51 Initially,
the United States was its largest funding agent.5 2 U.S. support corre-
sponded with a period of concern by other nations' governments about
their abilities to provide adequate health, education, food, and social ser-
vices to their residents and liberal reformation of abortion legislation
abroad.5 3 Not surprisingly, by the late 1960s, the grassroots domestic and
international reproductive rights movement had begun to expand and
strengthen.
5 4
B. The 1970s
Although as a presidential candidate Richard Nixon strongly opposed
abortion,5 5 as President he continued the 1960s trend of U.S. financial
support for global population programs.5 6 During Nixon's administration,
it became clear that abortion had evolved in America from a public health
issue to a moral and a women's rights issue, with political action groups at
the vanguard of the transformation.5 7 The American populace was clearly
polarized in its opinions.58
Pro-choice activists and other feminists hailed the January 22, 1973
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,5 9 which established Ameri-
can women's constitutional right to abortion access. 60 The decision, how-
ever, was only a partial victory for women's self-determination. 6 1 It
acknowledged increasing state interests in protecting an unborn fetus as
pregnancy progresses. 62 The decision emboldened pro-life activists and
many religious leaders and organizations to champion a massive move-
50. Sinding et al., supra note 48, at 23.
51. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 67.
52. See id. For subsequent funding trends, see infra note 100.
53. See Sinding et al., supra note 48, at 23; see also Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global
Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women's Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the
Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 757-59 (2004).
54. See Angela Hooton, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing
Mainstream and Latina Feminism, 13 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 59, 61 (2005).
55. See TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 196. The National Organization of
Women, which in 1967 had announced its interest in liberalizing state abortion statutes,
lobbied for such reforms throughout the 1970s and also campaigned for and against
candidates for Congress based on their positions on abortion. See id. at 153. Also, the
National Abortion Rights Action League, founded in 1969 as the National Association
for the Repeal of Abortion Laws, actively sought abortion law reformation. See id. The
Roman Catholic Church and its allied interest groups were the most important contribu-
tors to the active pro-life movement during the 1970s. See id. at 155.
56. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 67.
57. See TATALOviCH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 83.
58. See id. at 197.
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. See Hooton, supra note 54, at 61-62.
61. See id.
62. See id. Commentators have suggested that the Roe decision would engender a
"shift from dangerous to safe abortions," thus perhaps enabling a shift of moral debate
from protecting fetal life to advancing women's health. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why
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ment, premised on the immorality of abortion, to undermine the Roe deci-
sion. 63 They personally confronted and attempted to intimidate women
seeking abortions and sought change through state and federal legisla-
tion.64 Indeed, in 1973 alone, eighteen constitutional amendments were
introduced into Congress either to entirely prohibit abortion or radically
restrict abortion rights.6 5
In that same year, having failed domestically to legislatively reverse the
impact of Roe v. Wade,66 pro-life groups took a path of lesser resistance and
partially derailed the momentum of U.S.-supported international popula-
tion assistance. 6 7 They enlisted the aid of Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina, a Southern Baptist whose pro-life stance was based on his ultra-
conservative religious beliefs. 68 Senator Helms, a politician who regularly
wore his religion on his shirt sleeve and wanted the continued support of
his pro-life constituents, 6 9 successfully sponsored an amendment to the
FAA to forbid NGOs from using federal governmental funding "for the per-
formance of abortions as a method of family planning."70 The Helms
amendment did not forbid NGOs from utilizing money from other sources
for these purposes. 7 1 In 1974, despite President Nixon's strong support
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 619 (1990).
63. See Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTRO-
VERSIAL DECISION 3 (2005).
64. See TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 84-85; Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at
68-70.
65. See TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 191-94. In the years that followed
1973, ultra-conservatives, such as Senator Jesse Helms, introduced more constitutional
amendments in Congress. See id. at 181-82.
66. Although Roe v. Wade was not legislatively overruled, Congress did enact the
Hyde Amendment in 1976. Hyde Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439,
90 Stat. 1434 (1976). The amendment prohibited Medicaid-funded abortions except
"where the life of the mother would be endangered." Id. The Hyde Amendment was not
a prohibition on the use of non-government funds for abortions.
67. See TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 195.
68. Generally, Southern Baptists are considered evangelical, although some vocal
Southern Baptists are considered fundamentalists. See Walter Russell Mead, God's Coun-
try?, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2006, at 24, 27.
69. See Michael Lienesch, Right-Wing Religion: Christian Conservatism as a Political
Movement, 97 POL. Sci. Q. 403, 409 (1982).
70. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 104(f) (Dec. 30, 1974) (now codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151b(f)(1) (2006)). The prohibition applied to foreign NGOs as well as domestic
NGOs that subcontracted to foreign NGOs.
In proposing the 1973 amendment, after describing abortion as killing a "human
being who has done no wrong and has made no choice," Senator Helms suggested, in
emotionally- and morally-laden language, that "[u]nless Congress [enacts the amend-
ment] now, we will soon see the day when abortifacient drugs and techniques dominate
[US]AIDS's program, and the United States becomes the world's largest exporter of
death." 119 CONG. REC. 32292, 32293-94 (1973). After congressional action, he stated
that "[tihis is an important step forward... and one that will have international implica-
tions for a better world .... [The] "provisions ... highlight the moral nature of the
problem of abortion, and the repugnance with which Congress views any attempt to
enlarge or expand the practice of abortion." 119 CONG. REC. 39619, 39620 (1973).
71. The NGOs were required to maintain separate accounts for U.S. governmental
aid and money from other sources to be able to prove compliance. See LARRY NOWELS,
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for global population programs, 72 USAID created policy (later promulgated
as a regulatory prohibition) against providing U.S. funding for "informa-
tion, education, training, or communication programs that seek to promote
abortion as a method of family planning." 73 As a result, over the subse-
quent three decades, no U.S. funding could be used to provide abortions
abroad except to save a woman's life or in cases of rape or incest.7 4
C. The 1980s
The remainder of the 1970s, during the presidencies of Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter, 75 resulted in continued but muted government support
for international family planning initiatives. 7 6 The tide changed under
President Ronald Reagan. 77 The Religious Right and pro-life constituency,
which had actively and forcefully supported President Reagan's quest for
the White House in 1980,78 made significant headway in the international
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING: THE MEXICO CITY POLICY
CRS-3 (2001), available at http://www.policyalmanac.org/culture/archive/abortion-
MexicoCity.pdf [hereinafter THE MEXICO CITY POLICY].
72. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 67 (relating President Nixon's support for the
1974 U.N. World Population Conference in Bucharest, during which the American dele-
gation pushed its agenda on a policy favoring immediate action worldwide to reduce
high fertility).
73. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE BUSH GLOBAL GAG RULE: A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2000), available at http://www.crlp.org/pdf/pub-bp_
bushggrviolation.pdf (referencing USAID, POLICY DETERMINATION No. 56, A.I.D. POLI-
CIES RELATIVE TO ABORTION-RELATED ACTIVITIES 2 (1974)); see also Family Planning and
Population Assistance Activities, 48 C.F.R. § 752.7016(b) (1996); Ernst et al., supra note
53, at 774.
74. Ernst et al., supra note 53, at 774.
75. As a presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter had refused to take a clear stand
regarding abortion. See TATALOVICH & DAYNES, supra note 34, at 198-99; see also FRED-
ERICK S. JAFFE ET AL., ABORTION POLITICS 118-19 (1981). President Carter entered office
"arguing for restraint and morality in foreign policy," and he was known for connecting
U.S. political support and foreign developmental aid to "basic human needs." James H.
Lebovic, National Interests and U.S. Foreign Aid: The Carter and Reagan Years, 25 J. PEACE
RES. 115, 116 (1988). President Carter's perception of national interests harbored some
Cold War mentality, but humanitarian interests were a main component of his foreign
aid policy. Id. (explaining that the "Carter aid policy was promoted as a means of
achieving international agreement in areas of concern to the United States, 'to demon-
strate... America's compassion for the poor and dispossessed around the world', and to
help the US 'compete effectively with the Soviets in the Third World."') (footnotes
omitted).
Presidential candidate Gerald Ford indicated his pro-life position with half-hearted
support for a states'-rights constitutional amendment. See id. at 118.
76. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 68. The debate on the impact of the population
explosion evolved while President Reagan was in office. In 1977, the Carter administra-
tion considered high fertility a threat to economic development. See NOWELS & VIEL-
LETTE, supra note 48, at CRS-3.
77. NOWELS & VIELLETTE, supra note 48, at CRS-3.
78. In 1980, Ronald Reagan won the presidency with only 26% of the electorate,
with the Christian Right accounting for two-thirds of his 10-point lead over incumbent
Jimmy Carter. See Sara Diamond, The Christian Right Seeks Dominion: On the Road to
Political Power and Theocracy, PUBLICEYE, http://www.publiceye.org/eyes/sd-theo.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
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realm,7 9 where foreign individuals and entities were not only powerless to
oppose them but also dependent on foreign aid.80 An important personal-
ity in this regard was James L. Buckley. After Roe v. Wade, then former U.S.
Senator Buckley sponsored several -unsuccessful constitutional amend-
ments to ban abortion, suggesting that his actions were necessary because
of "the ethical tradition of more than 2000 years of Western civilization" 8 1
and a slippery slope toward convenience-based euthanasia. 8 2 While serv-
ing in the Reagan administration as Under Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Security Affairs from 1981 to 1982, Buckley was unable to eradicate
all U.S. funding for population assistance.8 3 Nonetheless, he persevered in
his efforts to curtail funding for international family planning. Upon the
urging of pro-life supporters, President Reagan named him as chairman of
the U.S. delegation to the 1984 U.N. International Conference on Popula-
tion in Mexico City.8 4 This appears to have been a tactical self-interested
move by Reagan, who was running for reelection, to ensure enlarged sup-
port by the Religious Right,8 5 support which had been essential to his 1980
campaign for the presidency.8 6
It was at that August 1984 conference in Mexico City that the U.S.
delegation, led by Buckley, took a position contrary to that of delegations
from many developing countries and to that of the United States during the
previous decades. 8 7 The delegation contended-with the approval of Presi-
dent Reagan-that population growth was a neutral, rather than a negative,
force in economic development.8 8 In connection with this altered U.S.
79. For example, the Religious Right supported the Reagan administration's channel-
ing of aid to the Nicaraguan contras. See, e.g., SARA DIAMOND, SPIRITUAL WARFARE: THE
POLITICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 151-52 (1989).
80. Although the domestic pro-life movement supported the notion of a constitu-
tional amendment banning abortion, there was not sufficient nationwide support.
Instead, the pro-life movement turned its attention to limiting domestic funding for abor-
tion and contraceptive services and to eliminate governmental funding for international
population assistance. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 68-69.
81. JAMES L. BUCKLEY, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: A VIEW FROM THE SENATE 52 (1975).
82. See id. at 52; RUBIN, supra note 33, at 139-43 (explaining that Senator Buckley
attempted several constitutional amendments).
83. See Teitelbaum, supra note 38, at 69.
84. See id.
85. The Religious Right strongly supported President Reagan's re-election in 1984.
See Diamond, supra note 78.
86. See id. At the time of the 1984 presidential election, exit polls indicated that
only 8% of Americans considered abortion as a top issue for them in choosing a presi-
dent. See Lydia Saad, Public Opinion about Abortion-An In-Depth Review: Abortion as a
Voting Issue, GALLOP POLL, Jan. 22, 2002.
87. See NOWELS & VEILLETTE, supra note 48, at CRS-3.
88. See id. Economists and social scientists came to think that rising populations
would spur countries' demand, innovation, productivity, and economic growth, particu-
larly after dependent youths became contributing adults. See, e.g., Deannis A. Ahlburg,
Julian Simon and the Population Growth Debate, 24 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 317 (1998);
Robin Barlow, Population Growth and Economic Growth: Some More Correlations, 20 POPU-
LATION & DEV. REV. 153 (1994); Edward M. Crenshaw et al., Population Dynamics and
Economic Development: Age-Specific Population Growth Rates and Economic Growth in
Developing Countries, 1965 to 1990, 62 Am. Soc. REV. 974 (1997); Allen C. Kelley, Eco-
nomic Consequences of Population Change in the Third World, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 1685
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stance, the delegation announced a new U.S. policy, the "Mexico City Pol-
icy," later dubbed the Global Gag Rule (GGR). 8 9 This new policy prohib-
ited foreign NGOs receiving U.S. funds,90 either directly or as sub-
recipients through domestic NGOs, from performing or actively promoting
abortions "as a method of family planning" regardless of whether the
money used for those purposes was from the U.S. government or other
sources. 9 1 USAID began applying the GGR on January 1, 1985.92 In the
months that followed, USAID adopted regulatory rules for eligibility for
U.S. funding.93 These eligibility rules required an international or foreign
NGO to certify, by signing a financial assistance agreement, the "Standard
Provision," that it would refrain from using U.S. aid for: (1) procurement or
distribution of equipment intended for use in abortions as a method of
family planning, (2) fees or payments intended to coerce or motivate
women to have abortions, (3) payments to persons to perform abortions or
to solicit persons to undergo abortions, (4) information, education, train-
ing or communication programs that seek to promote abortion as a family
planning method, (5) grassroots and legislative lobbying for abortion, and
(6) biomedical research relating to abortions or involuntary
sterilizations. 94
Opponents of the GGR attempted judicially and legislatively to have
the USAID rules altered. Three domestic NGOs 9 5 brought separate law-
(1988); Mark Perlman, Some Economic Growth Problems and the Part Population Policy
Plays, 89 Q. J. ECON. 247 (1975); R. Paul Shaw, Government Perceptions of Population
Growth, 30 POPULATION STUD. 77 (1976).
89. See NOWELS & VEILLETTE, supra note 48, at CRS-3.
90. To accommodate foreign governments' sovereign prerogative, the policy did not
apply to overseas governments. See id. at CRS-4-5. Nonetheless, recipient foreign gov-
ernments were required to maintain separate accounts for U.S. aid that USAID could
monitor. See id.
91. THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-3. According to USAID, abortion
is considered a "method of family planning when it is for the purpose of spacing births,
including (but not limited to) abortions performed for the physical or mental health of
the mother. To perform abortions is defined as the operation of a 'facility where abor-
tions are performed as a method of family planning."' Id. at CRS-2. Promoting abortion
is the commitment of resources "'in a substantial or continuing effort to increase the
availability or use of abortion as a method of family planning."' Id. at CRS-3.
92. See id. at CRS-4.
93. Id. at CRS-4 n. 7.
94. If the direct funding recipient were a domestic NGO that sub-granted U.S. funds
to a foreign NGO, the direct recipient organization was required to certify that it would
obtain the proper certifications from the sub-grantee. See id. at CRS-4. Specifically, the
NGO was required to sign a statement that it "will not furnish assistance for family
planning under this grant to any foreign non-governmental organization which performs
or actively promotes abortion." DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d
275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On the other hand, if the direct funding recipient were a
foreign NGO, such as the International Planned Parenthood Foundation of London
(IPPF), it was required to sign the full certification itself, whether or not it would sub-
grant the funds to another foreign NGO. See THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at
CRS-4.
95. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd., see DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d 275, The Pathfinder
Fund, see Pathfinder Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 746 F. Supp. 192 (D.D.C. 1990), and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, see Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990).
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suits constitutionally challenging the eligibility requirements applied to
U.S. NGOs, which, unlike the Standard Provision for foreign NGOs, did
not contain the prohibition against utilizing private financial resources for
abortion-related activities. 96 Rather, the challenged Standard Provision
applicable to domestic NGOs provided that they must certify that they
neither would provide aid for family planning under the grant to a partici-
pating foreign NGO nor would grant financial support to a foreign NGO
for abortion-related activities. 9 7 None of the lawsuits were successful. 98
Despite numerous attempts over the following six years, Congress was una-
96. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 915 F.2d 59; DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d 275;
Pathfinder Fund, 746 F. Supp. 192.
97. See DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d at 278.
98. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 915 F.2d 59; DKT Mem'l Fund, 887 F.2d 275;
Pathfinder Fund, 746 F. Supp. 192.
In DKT Memorial Fund, the majority held that the certification requirement did not
restrict the domestic NGO from using its private funds for abortion or its promotion and
did not require the NGO to be a mouthpiece for government policy with its own funds.
887 F.2d at 275. Therefore, despite the passionate partial dissent of Justice Ginsburg,
the majority did not find the NGO's First Amendment free speech rights infringed. Id.
Moreover, the majority concluded that it had no jurisdiction to decide the NGO's asser-
tion that the GGR infringed its First Amendment right of freedom of association when it
used its own funds, rather than USAID money, to make grants to foreign NGOs. Id. at
296. The majority dismissed this claim on ripeness grounds and not on the merits. Id.
It noted, however, that neither it nor the Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitu-
tion protects rights of association between organizations. Id. at 293.
In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the domestic NGO alleged that the GGR
infringed on its First Amendment rights. 915 F.2d 59. It asserted that the GGR pre-
vented it from associating and collaborating with foreign NGOs, such as Planned
Parenthood's foreign affiliates. Id. at 60-61. This constraint thwarted the foreign NGOs
from satisfying their missions regarding reproductive rights advocacy. The court
rejected the assertion, finding "no constitutional rights implicated" by the statute or the
Standard Provision because domestic NGOs are free under the GGR to use their own
funds to pursue abortion-related activities in foreign countries and that any harm is the
result of foreign NGOs choosing to take USAID funds. Id. at 66. Additionally, respond-
ing to the assertion by Planned Parenthood that the Standard Provision imposes an
unconstitutional condition on the domestic recipient of a government benefit, the court
determined that the Standard Provision did not prevent Planned Parenthood from acting
as a funding agent in any particular country in two capacities: (1) as a conduit of U.S.
funds to foreign NGO subcontractors whose activities are not abortion-related, and (2)
as a grantor of non-U.S. funds to foreign NGOs having abortion-related activities. Thus,
the court held that the Standard Provision did not impose an unconstitutional condi-
tion. Id.
In Pathfinder Fund, the court addressed the issue left undecided by the Court of
Appeals in DKT International. 746 F. Supp. 192. Specifically, it considered whether the
First Amendment right of expressive association of Pathfinder Fund and two other
domestic NGOs was infringed by the GGR. Id. at 193. The court held that the NGOs'
right of expressive association was not infringed because (1) the domestic NGOs were
free to use private funds to carry out abortion-related projects abroad and free to associ-
ate with non-certifying foreign NGOs to perform abortion-related initiatives, (2) the
domestic NGOs were not prevented from associating with foreign NGOs for abortion in
certain circumscribed circumstances, and (3) six of the eight foreign NG~s with which
Pathfinder Fund et al. desired to associate were not subject to the Standard Provision. Id.
at 195-99. Thus, the court held that the Standard Provision did not impose a "substan-
tial burden" on Pathfinder Fund et al. Id. at 199. The court determined that the Stan-
dard Provision was rationally related to the government's interests and found the
Standard Provision constitutional as applied to Pathfinder Fund et al. Id.
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ble to enact any measures to alter the GGR. 99
USAID withdrew funding from foreign NGOs that refused to sign the
Standard Provision. 10 0 For example, International Planned Parenthood
Foundation (IPPF), London, a large and visible NGO dedicating less than
1% of its budget, approximately $400,000 annually, to abortion-related
work, was quickly affected.' 0 ' For years, it had received approximately
$11-$12 million annually (25% of its budget) from USAID; now USAID
declined to appropriate this entire amount to IPPF. 10 2 IPPF was not alone
in suffering severe financial consequences; 10 3 records indicate that numer-
ous foreign NGOs were financially unable to support staff or even to con-
99. See THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-12.
100. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), a U.N. agency seeking to
improve the health of women and children globally but providing no abortion services
was another financial victim of the Reagan administration and family planning oppo-
nents. See UNFPA, About UNFPA: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), http://
www.unfpa.org/about/faqs.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007); see also LARRY NOWELS, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, POPULATION ASSISTANCE AND FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS: ISSUES
FOR CONGRSS CRS-7 (2003) [hereinafter ISSUES FOR CONGRESS]. UNFPA had received the
bulk of its financial support from the United States since its 1969 inception. See U.S.
Support for Family Planning Overseas: The Program and the Politics, IssuEs IN BRIEF
(Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 1997, available at http://
www.guttmacher.org.pubs/ib2.html [hereinafter U.S. Support for Family Planning Over-
seas]. Under allegations that UNFPA was complicit in China's coercive family planning
practices-allegations that a 1985 USAID study actually disproved-the United States at
first delayed and then withheld financial support from UNFPA. See ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS, supra, at CRS-8; Tara A. Gelman, Note, The Blurred Line Between Aiding Progress
and Sanctioning Abuse: United States Appropriations, the UNFPA and Family Planning in
the P.R.C., 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1063, 1088-96 (2001). As with their actions with
respect to the GGR, although President Clinton reinstated U.S. contributions to UNFPA,
President George W. Bush has withheld funding of $25 million to $34 million annually
since 2002. See ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra, at CRS-8-10; Kim Krisberg, Global Family
Planning Efforts Struggle with U.S. Funding Cuts, NATION'S HEALTH (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 1,
2006, at 1-3, available at http://www.apha.org/publications/tnh/archives/2006/08-06/
Globe/2798.htm.
101. See THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-5.
102. See id. at CRS-6.
103. USAID withdrew $10 million of aid earmarked for UNFPA. See id. at CRS-7. The
money was withheld not because UNFPA practiced or promoted abortion but rather
because of its commitments in China, a country that the U.S. government considered to
coerce family planning through sterilization and abortion practices. See id. at CRS-7 n.
16; Susan A. Cohen, The United States and the United Nations Population Fund: A Rocky
Relationship, 2 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 1 (1999), available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/02/1/grO2OlOl.pdf; U.S. Support for Family Planning Over-
seas, supra note 100. China's perceived coerciveness was clearly contrary to the Supreme
Court's long-standing acknowledgement of our constitutional values prohibiting coer-
cive sterilization. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Population Insti-
tute, along with other NGOs, filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking to enjoin the USAID
Administrator from withholding the $10 million. See Population Inst. v. McPherson,
797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986). After many twists and turns and an appeal, the circuit
court ultimately upheld the USAID Administrator's decision to deny the funding to
UNFPA. See id. at 1074. For a description of the lawsuit, see Tobey E. Goldfarb, Absti-
nence Breeds Contempt: Why the U.S. Policy on Foreign Assistance for Family Planning Is
Cause for Concern, 33 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 345, 360-61 (2003). The year after President
Clinton removed the GGR, see infra note 109-11 and accompanying text, Representative
Christopher Smith and several Chinese nationals filed a lawsuit against the new USAID
Administrator to enjoin disbursement of USAID grant monies to UNFPA. Smith v.
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tinue their work after some period of fiscal deprivation. 10 4 Although
USAID alleged that it reallocated governmental funds from non-certifying
NGOs to certifying NGOs, 10 5 opponents of the GGR suggested that the
most experienced, connected, and effective of the former foreign NGOs
were excluded from USAID funding. 10 6
D. The 1990s
To the chagrin of the Religious Right,10 7 the United States officially
changed its position on tying foreign aid grants to the GGR when President
Bill Clinton took office. 0 8 One of President Clinton's first acts in office on
his inaugural day, January 22, 1993, was to abolish the GGR and to issue
instructions to the Administrator of USAID to remove the Standard Provi-
sion from USAID grant documentation. 10 9 In his memorandum on the
policy withdrawal, President Clinton explained that the GGR was exces-
sively broad, was not mandated by the FAA, and "ha[d] seriously under-
mined much needed efforts to promote safe and efficacious family
planning programs in foreign nations."1 10 In public remarks that same
day, President Clinton stated that reversal of the GGR would "allow us to
once again provide leadership in helping to stabilize world population."" '
Opponents in Congress attempted to legislate modifications to President
Clinton's removal of the policy, but, under threat of presidential veto, they
Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1994). The court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. For a
discussion of Smith, see Goldfarb, supra, at 361-62.
104. See, e.g., DINA BOGECHO, AcCEss DENIED: THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL GAG RULE IN
KENYA (2006), available at http://www.globalgagrule.org/pdfs/case studies/GGRcase_
kenya_2006.pdf; Mehlika Hoodbhoy et al., Special Report: Exporting Despair: The
Human Rights Implications of U.S. Restrictions on Foreign Health Care in Kenya, 29 FORD-
HAM INT'L. LJ. 1 (2005); see also PATTY SKUSTER, AcCEss DENIED: THE IMPACT OF THE
GLOBAL GAG RULE IN NEPAL (2006), available at http://www.globalgagrule.org/pdfs/case
_studies/GGRcase-nepal.pdf; DINA BOGECHO & SARAH HADDOCK, AcCESs DENIED: THE
IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL GAG RULE IN ZAMBIA (2006), available at http://www.globalgag
rule.org/pdfs/case studies/GGRcaseZambia 2006.pdf.
105. In 1991, Representative Smith reported that 400 NGOs had signed the Standard
Provision. See THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-5. Skeptics have sug-
gested that many NGOs signed the certification statement in order to ensure their sur-
vival, whether or not they actually complied with the GGR. See, e.g., THE MEXICO CITY
POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-5; Patty Skuster, Advocacy in Whispers: The Impact of the
USAID Global Gag Rule upon Free Speech and Free Association in the Context of Abortion
Law Reform in Three East African Countries, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 97 (2004).
106. See THE MEXICO CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-9.
107. The Religious Right did not support President Clinton's candidacy and demon-
ized him while in office, even seeking his impeachment. See, e.g., Chip Berlet, Clinton,
Conspiracism, and the Continuing Culture War, PUB. EYE, Spring 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/vl3n1/PE_- V13-Nl.pdf. Throughout his tenure as
president, they were unable to influence President Clinton's foreign policy and foreign
assistance policy decisions.
108. Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 22, 1993).
109. Id. The changed position resulted in IPPF applying anew for USAID grants,
unlike numerous other foreign NGOs that the GGR previously affected. See THE MEXICO
CITY POLICY, supra note 71, at CRS-9.
110. Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, supra note 108, at 10-11.
111. Remarks on Signing Memorandums on Medical Research and Reproductive
Health and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 6, 8 (January 22, 1993).
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were unsuccessful at that time. 1 12
Abortion opponents continued to exert political pressure on President
Clinton to reinstitute the GGR. 113 Finally, in 1999, President Clinton
made a political compromise.114 In exchange for congressional support to
permit U.S. payment of nearly $1 billion that it owed the United Nations,
Congress enacted legislation, expiring at the end of fiscal year 2000. This
legislation restricted eligibility for USAID funding to foreign NGOs agree-
ing to three certification restrictions that were slightly more limited than
the certification requirements instituted under President Reagan. 1 5 Enti-
tlement to USAID funds was predicated on an NGO certifying that it would
refrain from using funds, regardless of their source, for: (1) performing
abortions in a foreign country, except in cases of incest, rape, or where
pregnancy endangered the life of the mother, (2) violating a foreign coun-
try's laws regarding abortion, or (3) attempting to alter foreign nations'
laws or governmental policies concerning abortion restrictions, regula-
tions, or entitlement. 116 In a concession to President Clinton, Congress
legislatively enabled the President to have the certification requirement
waived for up to $15 million in USAID grants to foreign NGOs, but his
election of this waiver would trigger the penalty of reducing population aid
appropriation to child health programs by $12.5 million. 117 President
Clinton exercised his waiver election on November 30, 1999, one day after
signing the legislation. 118 The beneficiaries of this waiver were the IPPF,
one of the organizations denied USAID funding during President Reagan's
administration due to its refusal to sign the certification, the World Health
Organization, and seven other NGOs.1 19
E. The New Millennium
In 2001, President George W. Bush won his first term in office in a
contentious battle that did not give him the majority of the American popu-
lar vote. 120 Although exit polls showed that nationwide only 14% of voters
considered abortion a top issue in their choice, 12 1 some analysts consider
112. See NOWELS & VEILLETTE, supra note 48, at CRS-6.
113. Id.
114. See Statement on Signing Consolidated Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal
Year 2000, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2156, 2159-60 (Nov. 29, 1999) (stating that despite the bill's
inclusion of the contested provision on international family planning, President Clinton
instructed USAID to implement the new restrictions "in such a way as to minimize to the
extent possible the impact on international family planning efforts").
115. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 599D, 113
Stat. 1501 (1999).
116. Id.
117. Id. See ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 100, at CRS-5.
118. See id.
119. See id. at CRS-5-6.
120. See INFOPLEASE, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, ELECTORAL AND POPULAR VOTE
SUMMARY, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0876793.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007)
(showing that President Bush received 47.87% of the popular vote and Al Gore, Jr.
received 48.38% of the popular vote).
121. See Saad, supra note 86.
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the issue to have been pivotal in Bush's victory. 12 2
President Bush, a devoutly conservative "born again" Methodist 123
and ardently pro-life 12 4 politician, quickly found a symbolically potent
means of repaying his crucial pro-life constituency, mainly composed of
solidly conservative Roman Catholics, fundamentalist Christians, and
evangelical Christians. 125 On January 22, 2001, as one of his first official
122. See id.
123. President Bush was raised as an Episcopalian but after "a life-changing conver-
sion[ ] around the age of forty," in which he went "from being a nominal Christian to a
born-again believer," he joined the United Methodist Church. JIM WALLIS, GOD'S POLIT-
ICS 139 (2005).
124. See PETER SINGER, THE PRESIDENT OF GOOD & EVIL: THE ETHICS OF GEORGE W.
BUSH 34-114 (2004). President Bush has repeatedly expressed opposition to abortion
and stem-cell research. He made one illustrative broad pro-life statement on August 9,
2001: "I worry about a culture that devalues life, and believe as your President I have an
important obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and throughout
the world." See id. at 34. Furthermore, at the second presidential debate on October 8,
2004 at Washington University, President Bush stated: "[W]e're not going to spend
taxpayers' money on abortion. This is an issue that divides America, but certainly rea-
sonable people can agree on how to reduce abortions in America. I signed the partial-
birth - the ban on partial-birth abortion. It's a brutal practice. It's one way to help
reduce abortions." Transcript: Second Presidential Debate, Wash. Univ., Oct. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_
1008.html.
125. Polls differ slightly on their calculations of which religious groups voted for Pres-
ident Bush. Researcher John Green suggests that 84% of Traditionalist Evangelicals,
who he considers the Religious Right, are pro-life. John Green & Steven Waldman, The
Twelve Tribes of American Politics, BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/153/
story_15355.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). That group of voters represented 27% of
President Bush's support in 2000. John Green & Steven Waldman, Twelve Tribes: Per-
centage of 2004 Voters: A Comparison of the 2004 and 2000 Electorate Percentages,
BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/167/story_16773.html (last visited Aug. 8,
2007) thereinafter Twelve Tribes Electorate Percentages]. According to Green and Wald-
man, two other solidly conservative religious groups, Traditional Christians and Moder-
ate Evangelicals, comprised 31% of President Bush's vote in 2000. See id.
An exit poll undertaken by the Pew Research Center indicates that in 2000, 68% of
white evangelicals voted for President Bush and 30% voted for Al Gore. The Pew
Research Ctr. for the People and the Press, Religion and the Presidential Vote, http://
people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysislD=103 (last visited Aug. 20, 2007)
(comparing the 2000 and 2004 elections). A Gallup poll reveals that in October 2000,
of the 1008 respondents, 15.36% identified themselves as part of the conservative Chris-
tian political movement known as the Religious Right and 76.99% stated they definitely
did not identify as such. The Gallup Org., Gallup Brain, Question D29, http://brain.
gallup.com/documents/question.aspx?question=151320 (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
A follow-up Gallup poll showed that in November 2004, 17.45% of the 1,016 partici-
pants identified themselves as part of the Religious Right and 73.49% stated that they
definitely did not identify as such. The Gallup Org., Gallup Brain, Question D26, http:/
/brain.gallup.com/documents/question.aspx?question=151320 (last visited Oct. 3,
2006). John Green suggests that 88% of Traditionalist Evangelicals (the Religious Right)
voted for President Bush in 2004, and that they represented 15% of the total electorate.
See John Green & Steven Waldman, Twelve Tribes: 2004 and 2000 Comparison: How Did
the Votes of the Twelve Tribes in 2004 Compare to 2000?, BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.
com/story/161/story 16168.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007); Twelve Tribes Electorate
Percentages, supra. This group represented 26% of President Bush's support in his 2004
election. See Twelve Tribes Electorate Percentages, supra.
Walter Russell Mead asserts that forty percent of the vote supporting Bush for reelec-
tion came from evangelicals. God's Country? A Conversation with Walter Russell Mead
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acts on his first day in office, President Bush restored all restrictive mea-
sures of the original GGR that President Reagan instituted in 1984.126 His
action ignored the preferences of the 80% of Americans who supported
U.S. assistance for foreign family planning initiatives that would enable
women overseas to control the spacing and number of their children 12 7
and for "voluntary family-planning programs in developing nations."'128
He pushed ahead, commenting at the time that it "is my conviction that
taxpayer funds should not be used to pay for abortions or advocate or
actively promote abortion, either here or abroad."'12 9 His directive to the
Administrator of USAID prohibited foreign NGOs receiving U.S. funds,
either directly or as sub-recipients through domestic NGOs, from perform-
ing or actively promoting abortions "as a method of family planning"
regardless of whether the money used for those purposes was from the U.S.
government or other sources. 130 Furthermore, his directive added lan-
guage in the Standard Provision for grant eligibility that, under threat of
penalty, required any domestic or foreign recipient of USAID family plan-
ning aid to certify.that it would not pass along such USAID funds to foreign
NGOs that engage in such prohibited activities.' 3 ' USAID materials for
About His Foreign Affairs Article on Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Sept. 27, 2006. Mr. Mead asserts that "most evangelicals are as opposed to abortion as
most Catholics." See id.
126. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Admin. of the U. S. Agency
for Int'l Dev. on the Restoration of the Mexico City Policy (Jan. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010123-5.html.
127. See E. Dana Neacsu, Imposing Sexual Restraint Abroad, 11 MICH. ST. L. REV. 885,
887 (2002) (reporting that a 1999 Rand study revealed that four-fifths of Americans
supported U.S. assistance for foreign family planning initiatives that would enable
women overseas to control the spacing and number of their children).
128. See id. at 886. Critics have repeatedly cited the GGR as evidence that President
Bush ignores or manipulates science for his own ideological or political purposes. See,
e.g., Pramilla Senanayake & Susanne Hamm, Sexual and Reproductive Health Funding:
Donors and Restrictions, 363 LANCET 70, 70 (2004); Representative Henry A. Waxman,
Science, Politics, and Reproductive Rights: Politics and Science Reproductive Health, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 5, 5 (2006).
129. See Neacsu, supra note 127, at 886.
130. Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,301 (Mar. 28, 2001).
131. Id. The memorandum defines abortion as a "method of family planning" as:
"[Abortion for] the purpose of spacing births. This includes, but is not limited to, abor-
tions performed for the physical or mental health of the mother, but does not include
abortions performed if the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term or abortions performed following rape or incest (since abortion under
these circumstances is not a family planning act)." Id. at Definition (10)(i). Operating a
hospital, clinic, or other facility where abortions are performed as a method of family
planning is included in the definition of acts that constitute performing abortions. Id. at
Definition (10)(ii). The definitions provide that to "actively promote abortion" means
the commitment of financial or other resources "in a substantial or continuing effort to
increase the availability or use of abortion as a method of family planning." Id. at Defini-
tion (10)(iii). The active promotion of abortion includes, but is not limited to, counsel-
ing services, providing advice that abortion is an available option, and lobbying a
foreign government to legalize or make available abortion. Id. at Definition(10)(iii)(A)(1-llI).
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grantees comported with the President's directives. 13 2
Despite repeated reports of the negative impact of the GGR on women
in developing countries and on foreign NGOs, 13 3 on August 29, 2003,
President Bush, looking toward a reelection campaign where the Religious
Right would be important, 1 34 expanded the GGR's application to U.S. State
Department initiatives. 1 35 With this expansion, the GGR's reach now
affects numerous State Department-managed programs, 136 many of which
are implemented by NGOs.13 7 Although President Bush announced in
2003 that foreign NGOs receiving assistance authorized under the United
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003 (USLA) are not subject to the GGR with respect to funds allocated in
fiscal years 2004-2008,138 NGOs remain subject to the GGR if they other-
wise receive, through USAID or the State Department, U.S. funds for family
planning and health programs under § 2151b of the FAA.139 This means
that despite their attempts to provide healthcare treatment and to save lives
in developing countries, any non-certifying foreign NGO whose activities
include both family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives actually
132. USAID, MANDATORY STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR NON-U.S., NONGOVERNMENTAL
RECIPIENTS 19 (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303mab.pdf.
133. See, e.g., Mexico City Policy Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Dr. Nirmal K.
Bista) (speaking on behalf of the Family Planning Association of Nepal (FPAN), a
Nepalese NGO committed to reproductive health care services, education, and counsel-
ing, testifying about FPAN's decision to refuse to sign the Standard Provision and lose
approximately $250,000 in USAID that would jeopardize the existence of three repro-
ductive health care clinics in densely populated areas of Nepal having high maternal
mortality rates); Id. (testimony of Aryeh Neier, President of the Open Society Institute)
(explaining the critical role of foreign NGOs in advocating for women's rights and in
drafting legislative reform, the GGR's undemocratic chilling impact on speech of foreign
NGOs, and the GGR's spillover effect in impeding domestic NGOs' efforts to bring rep-
resentatives of gagged foreign NGOs to brief Congress); Id. (testimony of Susana Galdos
Silva) (stating that the GGR has prevented Peruvian NGOs, such as Movimiento Manuela
Ramos, which has over 20 years experience in advocacy for women's well-being, from
advocating and lobbying for legalization of abortion despite Peru's high rates of
unwanted pregnancy (60% of all pregnancies), illegal abortions (30% of all
pregnancies), and maternal deaths caused by unsafe illegal abortions (22% of all mater-
nal deaths).
134. See supra note 125 (discussing 2000 and 2004 electorate polls).
135. Pres. George W. Bush, Memorandum on Assistance for Voluntary Population Plan-
ning, 39 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1124 (2003).
136. See Dewey Memorandum, supra note 26.
137. See POPULATION ACTION INT'L, supra note 26.
138. Id.
139. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-25, §§ 301(b)(1); 302(b)(1), 117 Stat. 711 (2003) (Congressional
authorization of funds in addition to those available under 22 U.S.C. 2151b(c) is to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004-2008).
The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003 (USLA) has a new gag rule. It provides that the recipients of funds under USLA
may not use the funds to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution
or sex trafficking or to provide assistance to "a group or organization that does not have
a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." Id. § 302(f). This new gag
rule neither permits fund recipients to take a neutral nor a silent stance. See infra notes
234-285 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving USLA and the constitution-
ality of its gag rule.)
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is prohibited from receiving U.S. funds under USLA.140 Moreover, this
directive effectively precludes a wide range of domestic and international
NGOs from creating coalitions and networks with non-certifying foreign
NGOs important to the delivery of reproductive and other healthcare ser-
vices. 14 1 For the most part, the language of the Standard Provision imple-
menting the GGR for the new millennium remained substantively identical
to its pre-2000 wording. 14 2 Slight modifications have not cured the under-
lying defects of the GGR.
II. U.S. National Interests
A. Concept
Critical components of foreign affairs are the result of foreign policy,
the allocation of foreign assistance, and the imposition of foreign assis-
tance policy restrictions. All of these facets are inextricably identified with
and guided by the pursuit of "national interests." This guiding concept,
U.S. "national interests," abstractly consists of those objectives that directly
or indirectly further the collective welfare of the U.S. government and
140. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, BREAKING THE SILENCE: THE GLOBAL GAG RULE'S
IMPACT ON UNSAFE ABORTION (2003), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/
bo.ggr.pdf [hereinafter CRR, BREAKING THE SILENCE]. This outcome is an expansion of
the August 6, 2003 decision of the U.S. State Department to fund a $1 million HIV/AIDS
program of UNFPA that supports African and Asian refugees only on the condition that
the implementing NGO consortium did not include Marie Stopes International, a non-
certifying NGO that provides family planning services, including abortion counseling,
and that does not receive U.S. assistance. See ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 100, at
CRS-11.
141. USAID, supra note 132.
142. Subparagraph (e)(II)(1) provides that any non-U.S. NGO recipient "certifies that
it does not now and will not during the term of this award perform or actively promote
abortion as a method of family planning in USAID-recipient countries or provide finan-
cial support to any other foreign nongovernmental organization that conducts such
activities." Id. at 56. Subparagraph (e)(I)(10) supplies definitions applicable to para-
graph (e). Id. at 53. Abortion "is a method of family planning when it is for the purpose
of spacing births. This includes, but is not limited to, abortions performed for the physi-
cal or mental health of the mother." Id. Pursuant to subparagraph (e)(I)(10)(ii), "[tlo
perform abortions means to operate a facility where abortions are performed as a
method of family planning." Id. Pursuant to subparagraph (e)(I)(10)(iii),
To actively promote abortion means for an organization to commit resources,
financial or other, in a substantial or continuing effort to increase the availabil-
ity or use of abortion as a method of family planning.
(A) This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Operating a family planning counseling service that includes, as part of
the regular program, providing advice and information regarding the ben-
efits and availability of abortion as a method of family planning;
(II) Providing advice that abortion is an available option in the event other
methods of family planning are not used or are not successful or encour-
aging women to consider abortion ...;
(III) Lobbying a foreign government to legalize or make available abortion as a
method of family planning or lobbying such a government to continue the
legality of abortion as a method of family planning; and;
(IV) Conducting a public information campaign in USAID-recipient countries
regarding the benefits and/or availability of abortion as a method of fam-
ily planning.
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broad American populace and that are achieved by domestic or interna-
tional acts. 143
B. Declared National Interests - WWII to Present
From the end of World War II through President Reagan's tenure and
into the early 1990s, U.S. foreign policy, foreign aid policy, and foreign
assistance programs were designed to support national interests, including
the defeat of communism, the encouragement of global economic develop-
ment and stability, the reduction of high rates of population growth, and
the promotion of broader access to health care.' 44 In 1984, in a radio
address to the nation on U.S. foreign policy, President Reagan declared that
regional stability and security, peacemaking in troubled countries, the
reduction of the risk of nuclear war, and the expansion of opportunities for
economic development and personal freedom were national challenges. 14 5
By 1988, President Reagan had added to his list something akin to cham-
pioning the cause of people's right to self-determination. 146
Post-Cold War, President Clinton considered the promotion of "sus-
tainable development" to be a "national interest" and his U.S. foreign assis-
tance policy and programs were crafted to foster "achievement of broad-
based economic growth; development of democratic systems; stabilization
of world population and protection of human health; . . . building human
capacity through education and training; and meeting humanitarian
needs."'14 7 President Bush redesigned U.S. foreign assistance policy ini-
tially around three "strategic pillars": economic growth, agriculture, and
Id. at 53-54.
143. See, e.g., Felix E. Oppenheim, National Interest, Rationality, and Morality, 15 POL.
THEORY 369, 369-70 (1987). Policy can be structured either to directly benefit the
United States and its citizens or to vicariously accrue to them while targeting another
nation and its citizens as the direct beneficiaries. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL
DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE 221
(1980). The subset of national interests that directly accrue to the U.S. government and
its citizens has been labeled "self-regarding." Id. Those national interests that indirectly
benefit the U.S. government and its citizens have been labeled "other-regarding." Id.
Both types of national interests can seek to attain, enhance, or preserve Americans'
security, health, and economic stability, but the means utilized are different for each
category. See id.
144. See TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 8, at CRS-3; supra notes 39-50 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the declared national interests and foreign assistance policies of
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson); supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the declared national interests and foreign assistance policies of President Reagan).
145. Radio Address to the Nation on United States Foreign Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 487
(Oct. 20, 1984); see also Letter to Prime Minister Menachim Begin of Israel on United
States Military Assistance Policies for the Middle East, 1 PUB. PAPERS 177 (Feb. 16,
1982); Radio Address to the Nation on Free and Fair Trade, 1986 Book, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1037-38 (Sept. 13, 1986); Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Reporters
on the Pentagon Report on the Security of United States Marines in Lebanon, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1748 (Dec. 27, 1983); Statement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 818-19 (June 25, 1982).
146. Statement on the Ninth Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1656-57 (Dec. 27, 1988).
147. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 8, at CRS-3.
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trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian
assistance. 148 In 2004, Bush modified and expanded the pillars to include
five broad interests: promoting transformational development, strengthen-
ing fragile states, providing humanitarian assistance, supporting U.S. geo-
strategic interests, and mitigating global and international ills, including
HIV/AIDS. 149
C. National Interests or Self-Interests?
Clearly, these various sets of national interests and foreign assistance
policy objectives are inherently value-laden. 150 Their unmistakable goals
are in contradistinction to aims intended primarily to advance egotistic,
political, ideological, moral, or other self-interests of an individual or a nar-
row group of individuals. 15 1 This is not to say that each policymaker can
or should eliminate personal values in the decision-making processes. 152
Nonetheless, where a policymaker elevates moral or political self-interests
above prudent policies and practical measures that otherwise could pro-
mote national interests, that governmental representative not only fails to
make a high-quality decision that promotes national objectives 153 but also
neglects fiduciary duties to the electorate. 1 54
As architects of foreign policy and foreign assistance policy, the
actions of President Kennedy, in encouraging Congress to enact the FAA,
and President Johnson, in authorizing USAID to fund international family
planning and population initiatives without GGR restrictions, clearly pro-
moted three then official national interests: the encouragement of global
economic development and stability, the reduction of high rates of popula-
tion growth, and the promotion of broader access to health care. 1 5 5 Conse-
quently, their political, moral, and ideological self-interests are not called
into question. In stark contrast, as the discussion on the harms produced
by the GGR below highlights, it is impossible to reconcile the effects of the
GGR with those official national objectives.
President George W. Bush campaigned on the suggestion that his for-
eign policy decisions would be guided by national interests, stating during
the second presidential debate at Wake Forest University on October 11,
2000, "The first question is, what's in the best interests of the United
States? What's in the best interests of our people? When it comes to for-
eign policy, that'll be my guiding question. Is it in our nation's inter-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See GEORGE, supra note 143, at 221.
151. See id. at 3.
152. SeeJanet A. Weiss, Coping with Complexity: An Experimental Study of Public Policy
Decision-Making, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 66, 80-81 (1982).
153. See GEORGE, supra note 143, at 3.
154. See id.
155. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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ests?"'1 56 Despite his rhetoric, President Bush's restoration and expansion
of the GGR is at odds with the "strategic pillars" that he declared as
national interests. The. effects of the original or expanded version of the
GGR as instituted by Presidents Reagan and Bush cannot be squared with
USAID's long-standing national objectives of "expanding democracy and
free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing
world."'157 As a result, the motives of President Reagan in imposing the
GGR and of President George W. Bush in restoring and expanding the
GGR are implicated. Did these two presidents neglect their fiduciary
duties to U.S. citizens by unwisely acting primarily to further their per-
sonal religious and moral agendas and to win the crucial support of the
Religious Right? Did these presidents create a chasm between their expres-
sions of moralistic ideologies and their actual deeds? Were the outcomes
substantially diluted, rendered ineffective, or made inappropriate 15 8 at
unacceptable human, financial, political, and security costs?
D. Harms That the GGR Produced
The literature and media are peppered with numerous studies and
anecdotal information of the extensive negative consequences that the
GGR has wrought. These sources have given particular attention to the
hardships imposed on foreign NGOs and women living in developing
countries. Therefore, this Article only briefly recaps their findings.
1. Injuries to Foreign NGOs
In developing countries across the globe, the GGR has hampered or
even barred the efforts of foreign NGOs and their healthcare workers in the
delivery of reproductive health and family planning services as well as
HIV/AIDS related care. It has financially threatened the existence of NGOs
or has caused their demise. It also has precluded alliances of NGOs essen-
tial for solving public health crises. In countries that either legally permit
abortions in all situations or under circumstances of fetal impairment or
where pregnancy poses risks to a woman's mental health or socioeconomic
well-being, such as Nepal, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda,
and Romania, the loss of USAID funding by non-certifying NGOs has been
devastating. 159 The GGR has resulted in those NGOs laying off doctors
and nurses essential to the delivery of reproductive and child healthcare
services and HIV/AIDS prevention programs, curtailing or discontinuing
mobile clinics and other outreach services in hard-to-reach rural areas, ter-
minating community-based distributions of condoms and other contracep-
156. See Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-
Bush Presidential Debate, Oct. 11, 2000, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/
trans2000b.html.
157. This Is USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2007).
158. See GEORGE, supra note 143, at 3-4, 218.
159. For a list of the countries that permit abortions in all situations and under lim-
ited circumstances, see CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE WORLD'S ABORTION LAws
(2007), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub-fac-abortion laws.pdf.
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tive supplies, refraining from disseminating health information, and, in
some instances, closing because of their inability to financially sustain
themselves without U.S. funding. 160
The GGR has silenced efforts to reform abortion and reproductive
health laws in developing countries. 16 1 The GGR has chilled NGOs'
speech and stifled their attempts, either independently or in conjunction
with approving foreign governments, 16 2 to raise awareness of and provide
improved access to safe abortion services in countries with high levels of
maternal mortality and morbidity resulting from unsafe abortions. 163
Moreover, despite the legality of abortion without restriction in eighteen of
the fifty-six countries in which USAID family planning funds are allocated,
no foreign NGO medical care provider that receives any amount of USAID
assistance can counsel women on the full range of reproductive health
options or provide abortion referrals, even if supported by non-U.S. govern-
mental funds. 164 As will be discussed in Part IV, these various limitations
on speech and association likely would be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment if applied to domestic NGOs in the same position. 16 5
160. See Hoodbhoy et al., supra note 104, at 32-83; Rekha, supra note 26, at IA.
161. See Mexico City Policy Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Aryeh Neier, Presi-
dent of the Open Society Institute). Several sources have reported that domestic NGOs
are also impacted in their ability to advocate for safer abortion services and for legaliza-
tion of abortion abroad. See CRR, BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 140, at 12; CTR. FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE BUSH GLOBAL GAG RULE: ENDANGERING WOMEN'S HEALTH, FREE
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY (2003), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub-fac-ggrbush.html
[hereinafter CRR, BUSH GLOBAL GAG RULE]; Skuster, supra note 105, at 121-22; Melissa
Upreti, The Impact of the "Global Gag Rule" on Women's Reproductive Health Worldwide,
24 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 191, 195-96 (2003).
162. See Mexico City Policy Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Dr. Nirmal K. Bista)
(discussing the desires of Nepal's Ministry of Health and the Family Planning Associa-
tion of Nepal for reforms); Skuster, supra note 105, at 108-09. In eighteen countries
where abortion is legal in all situations, the GGR can prevent foreign NGOs from imple-
menting their governments' reproductive healthcare policies through discussions of
reproductive health options with women. See CTR FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE GLOBAL
GAG RULE'S EFFECTS ON NGOs IN 56 COUNTRIES (2003), available at http://
www.reproductiverights.org/pub-facggreffects.html [hereinafter CRR, GLOBAL GAG
RULE'S EFFECTS]. In addition, abortion is legal in seventeen other countries under limited
circumstances, including the protection of a woman's physical health, mental health,
life, or socioeconomic well-being. See id. However, the abortions available in these
countries are often performed under unsanitary and unsafe conditions, perhaps exacer-
bated by the GGR's ban on foreign NGOs providing counseling and safe services in
countries with reproductive healthcare policies that permit abortion for the mental
health and socioeconomic well-being of women. See id.
163. See id.; Skuster, supra note 105, at 106-07. The legalization of abortions in such
countries as the United States and Poland in the past several decades has contributed to
lower abortion-related mortality rates of women in these countries. In Poland, the legali-
zation of abortions has also contributed to the elimination of infanticide and suicides of
pregnant women. Jodi Jacobson, The Global Politics of Abortion, 97 WORLDWATCH PAPER
8 (1990). Thus, the capacity to lobby for reformation of abortion laws to permit legal
and safe abortions can have a tremendous positive impact on public health. I would
suggest that where other nations have chosen a set of moral values that permits abortion
without restriction, the U.S. needs to scrutinize the rationale and justification for U.S.
policies that actively interfere with that decision.
164. See CRR, GLOBAL GAG RULE'S EFFECTS, supra note 162.
165. See generally infra Part IV.
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2. Adversities to Women
Seventy percent of the world's one billion poorest people are
women. 16 6 These are the women for whom "the most dangerous thing...
[they] can do is to become pregnant."'1 6 7 They invariably live in developing
countries where their access to health services depends exclusively or to a
large extent on foreign NGOs whose programs are supported by FAA
§2151b funds. 168 In other words, these women are relegated to incomplete
family planning counseling and thereby are denied full information, self-
determined control over their fertility, 169 and self-dignity. They can
receive neither abortion referrals nor safe abortions from these NGOs. 170
Their lives are endangered.
Numerous statistics attest to the harm to these women. These women
have a likelihood of dying from pregnancy complications at a rate more
than 500 times that of women in the United States. 171 Even in the 61% of
the world's nations where abortions are legal, 17 2 such as South Africa and
Nepal which permit abortions upon a woman's request during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy, 173 complications from unsafe abortions con-
tinue. 174 These complications result from the persistence of substantial
166. Reproductive Equality, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2001, at A16.
167. Nicholas D. Kristof, 'Save My Wife,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at A15.
168. CRR, BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 140, at 9.
169. See id. at 28.
170. See CRR, GLOBAL GAG RULE'S EFFECTS, supra note 162.
171. Ruth Levine et al., Contraception, in DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1075, 1078 (Dean T. Jamison et. al. eds., 2006), available at http://
files.dcp2.org/pdf/DCP/DCP57.pdf (stating that developing countries account for 95%
of all illegal abortions worldwide and that between 100 and 600 deaths occur for every
100,000 unsafe, commonly illegal, abortions, whereas 0.6 deaths occur for every
100,000 legal abortions); Nicholas D. Kristof, Prudence's Struggle Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2006, at D12 (indicating that women in Africa have a 20% lifetime risk of dying in
childbirth); Reproductive Equality, supra note 166 (asserting that one in 3,750 American
women die from pregnancy complications).
172. AbortionFacts.com, World Abortion Statistics, http://www.abortionfacts.com/
statistics/worldstatistics.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
173. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, 2(1)(a) (S. Afr.). This stat-
ute reflects a provision in South Africa's constitution that provides "everyone has the
right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right ... to make deci-
sions concerning reproduction." S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 12. Nepal legalized abor-
tion in September 2002 with the 11th Amendment to the Homicide Chapter of the
Country Code ("Maluki Ain"). See Saving Women's Lives: Post Legalization Challenges
and Initiatives to Ensure Access to Safe Abortions in Nepal, REPROD. HEALTH RES. POL'Y
BRIEF (Ctr. for Research on Envtl. Health & Population Activities, Kathmandu, Nepal),
Apr. 2002, at 1, 1, available at http://www.crehpa.org.np/download/policy-brief_4.pdf
[hereinafter Post Legalization Challenges and Initiatives]; Reproductive Health and Rights in
Nepal, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/interna-
tional-work/reproductive-health-and-rights-in-nepal.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Reproductive Health].
174. See, e.g., N. Ojha et al., Post-Legalization Challenge: Minimizing Complications of
Abortion, 2 KATHMANDU UNIV. MED. J. 131, 131 (2004) (study providing data on abortion
complications); Post Legalization Challenges and Initiatives, supra note 173, at 1-2 (stat-
ing challenges to the availability of safe abortion); Reproductive Health, supra note 173
(reporting that Nepal suffers from one of the highest maternal mortality rates globally
and that a study of five hospitals found more than 50% of maternal deaths were the
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barriers to abortion information and services, 175 extremely high rates of
maternal deaths, 176  and long-term physical and mental health
problems. 177 Although it is difficult to obtain accurate data on illegal abor-
tions, in 2003, the World Health Organization estimated that between
twenty and twenty-five million abortions annually (half of all abortions)
are performed illegally under unsafe conditions. 178 Nearly 97% of all
unsafe abortions occur in developing countries. 179 Complications from
these unsafe abortions cause approximately 13% of all maternal deaths
and tens of thousands of long-term health problems in women world-
wide,180 including serious or permanent disabilities. 181 Additionally,
because NGOs fear jeopardizing their USAID funding by providing health-
care services to women who undergo abortion that technically is permitted
under the GGR, women may receive inferior healthcare after pregnancy.182
Moreover, the male and female children born from these pregnancies often
face increased risks of living unhealthy lives as well as shortened life
spans. 18 3
E. Presidents' Actions Inconsistent with National Interests
It is horrendous that the GGR exacerbates the harm to a large, vulnera-
ble audience of women and children about whom this nation should be
concerned. Moreover, on a broader scale, the multitude of deficiencies
does not end with individualized tragedies. The magnitude of serious
health problems and deaths suffered by women and children has produced
result of complications from abortion); see also Jacobson, supra note 163, at 8 (discuss-
ing the extent of the reduction in abortion-related mortality and suicides by pregnant
women in countries where laws were reformed to legalize abortion).
175. See Jacobson, supra note 163, at 12-20 (explaining the roadblocks to access,
including burdensome administrative requirements, lack of funding, lack of trained
providers, centralization of services in non-rural areas, local reluctance to implement
national laws, and medical regulations governing how, where, and by whom services
can be provided.)
176. See id. at 7.
177. See id.
178. See WHO, SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS
8 (2003), available at http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/safeabor-
tion/SafeAbortion.pdf [hereinafter WHO: SAFE ABORTION] (estimating forty to fifty mil-
lion abortions are performed annually, half of them performed illegally and unsafely);
David A. Grimes et al., Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable Pandemic, 368 THE LANCET
1908, 1908 (2006) (suggesting that nineteen to twenty million unsafe abortions occur
each year, 18.4 million of them in developing countries); Stanley K. Henshaw et al., The
Incidence of Abortion Worldwide, 25 INT'L FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. S30 (Supp. 1999),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/25s3099.html.
179. See Grimes et al., supra note 178, at 1908.
180. See WHO: SAFE ABORTION, supra note 178, at 8.
181. See CRR, BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 140, at 9; Levine et al., supra note
171, at 1078-79; Grimes et al., supra note 178, at 1, 3 (estimating that of the 68,000
deaths from unsafe abortions, 50% occurred in Asia and 44% in Africa; attributing
health complications from unsafe abortions to include hemorrhaging, sepsis, peritonitis,
and trauma to genitals and abdominal organs).
182. See CRR, BUSH GLOBAL GAG RULE, supra note 161.
183. See Levine et al., supra note 171, at 1078-79. These children also frequently face
extreme economic hardships.
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public health crises in developing countries, many of which are unable to
cope with these crises. 184 Women disabled and ill from unsafe abortions,
women who give birth to children they cannot feed or support financially,
and children of these tragedies who cannot attain a decent quality of life
due to poverty, hunger, ill health, and lack of education all add to their
countries' economic frailties.i85 These results undermine the economic
and political stabilities of these countries, as well as nations globally, and
contradict what the United States has declared to be its national interests
over the past fifty years. 186
If national interests are viewed more expansively than those officially
declared, then we find other injuries to them engendered by the acts of
Presidents Reagan and Bush. The Judeo-Christian principles embedded in
our nation and supposedly embraced by Presidents Reagan and Bush in
their official capacities and in their personal lives importantly encompass
two non-negotiable imperatives. First is the biblical teaching that each
individual must respect and act morally and justly toward all other human
beings born in this world, according them their self-dignity and helping
those in need. 1 8 7  Second is the principle that "ethical relationships
between individuals have priority over political and cultic values."18 8 A
president's unjustified compromise' 8 9 or disregard of these sacrosanct ten-
ets can mean the failure of reason to check self-interest and personal con-
cerns, 190 the loss of ethical and political proportionality,' 9 1 a distortion of
184. See CRR, BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 140, at 25-28.
185. See STAN BERNSTEIN & CHARLOTTE JUUL HANSEN, UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, PUBLIC
CHOICES, PRIVATE DECISIONS: SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 1-20 (2006).
186. See supra Part II.B. Health status is viewed as central to U.S. national interests,
including security and U.S. trade relations. See JORDAN S. KASSALOW, COUNCIL ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, WHY HEALTH IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001), available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Why-Health-Is-Important-To-For-
eign-Policy.pdf; JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN ET AL., ON THE BRINK: WEAK STATES AND US
NATIONAL SECURITY 1-3, 14-16 (2004).
187. See, e.g., Luke 10:27-37 (KingJames); see also HANSJ. MORGENTHAU, THE DECLINE
OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 319 (1962); Richard L. Rubenstein, Reflections on Religion and
Public Policy, in GLOBAL POLICY: CHALLENGE OF THE 80s 251, 255-56, 258 (Morton A.
Kaplan ed., 1982).
188. Rubenstein, supra note 187, at 259.
189. There is inherent tension between the inner-life of an individual and politics.
Every effective U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance policy is tinged with U.S. self-
interest (as distinguished from the president as its governmental agent). Nevertheless,
when viewed from the outside, decisions laced with moral compromises are judged by
their consequences, rather than the moral motives behind them. See Michael Walzer,
Can There Be a Moral Foreign Policy?, in LIBERTY AND POWER: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AN UNJUST WORLD 34, 36, 45-47 (E.J. Dionne Jr. et al. eds.,
2004); see also ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD, IDEALS AND SELF-INTEREST IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN
RELATIONS: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 14 (1953).
190. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 4 (1999)
(suggesting that such a compromise is a failure of moral reason); cf. Michael J. Perry,
What is "Morality" Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REV. 69, 96-97 (2000) (suggesting that it is not
moral reason that could permit such self-interest).
191. See MORGANTHAU, supra note 187, at 326.
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perspectives on power, 19 2 the failure of the civilizing influence of moral-
ity,1 9 3 and the breakdown of justice as a key moral ideal of society. 194
Therefore, even if these presidents viewed themselves as doing good with
noble intentions,1 9 5 in actuality they produced-contrary to national inter-
ests-ghastly consequences to fellow humans and to the world's image of
the United States as a highly moral democracy. 1
96
III. Possible Unconstitutionality of the GGR Based on Equal
Protection Principles
Although the GGR is harmful both to males and females, 19 7 like any
other restriction on abortion, it especially burdens women. 198 Legislation
directly grounded upon "a biological correlate of being female,"'199 can be a
form of sex discrimination.20 0 In the United States, where such legislation
involuntarily co-opts a woman's body in the service of third parties, com-
mentators have suggested that, under principles of equal protection, 20 1 leg-
islation restricting abortion should be considered constitutionally
suspect.20 2 In a recent Supreme Court case, Gonzales v. Carhart,20 3 Justice
192. See id. at 13, 326 (stating that the "self-esteem engendered by power, which
equates power and virtue, in the process loses all sense of moral and political
proportion").
193. See id. at 319. MichaelJ. Perry has quoted R. H. Tawney as having written about
this same notion: "The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human being
is of infinite importance, and therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify
the oppression of one by another. But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God."
PERRY, supra note 1, at 109 (quoting and citing R.H. TAWNEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK (J.M.
Winter & D.M. Joslin eds., 1972)).
194. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND
POLITICS 257 (1960) (recognizing, as an academic theologian and philosopher, the ten-
sion between ethics and politics, but stating that the highest moral ideal is justice).
195. Lefever, supra note 4, at 27. Hans J. Morgenthau, reflecting on Reinhold
Niebuhr's perspective, has commented aptly that to permit morality to clothe politics
with undeserved dignity merely transforms morality into an instrument of domination.
MORGENTHAU, supra note 187, at 14.
196. See OSGOOD, supra note 189, at 15.
197. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (noting the spill-over effects of the
GGR include inadequate health services for adult males and females as well as male and
female children).
198. See supra notes 166-183 and accompanying text.
199. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 617-18.
200. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitu-
tion, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1002-28 (1984); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARv. L. REv. 737, 788-91 (1989); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261
(1992); Sunstein, supra note 62, at 617-18.
201. The Supreme Court has generally taken the tact that reproductive distinctions
between genders does not prohibit differing legislation. See Siegel, supra note 200, at
264.
202. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 62, at 617-19. For more than 60 years, it has been
recognized that the equal protection right is one of freedom from invidious discrimina-
tion in statutory classification and other governmental action. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (where classification was based on race). Here, the
argument is based on defining the disadvantaged class as composed of all women, not
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a heart-felt dissent, emphasized this principle.
She stated that "legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion proce-
dures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather,
they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and
thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."20 4 Justice Ginsburg then noted
that historically, "[W]e have ... ruled that a State must avoid subjecting
women to health risks not only where the pregnancy itself creates danger,
but also where state regulation forces women to resort to less safe methods
of abortion." 20 5 Even Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion in Gon-
zales, which takes a paternalistic approach toward women and their health,
does not deny that legislative restrictions on abortion could be unconstitu-
tional where they impose "significant health risks" to women, particularly
where alternative safe abortion procedures are unavailable. 20 6
The GGR, as legislation of presidents (and a few congressional mem-
bers), effectively co-opts foreign women's bodies for the political and moral
self-interests of those politicians. It incontrovertibly forces women to
resort to less safe, often illegal, methods of abortion harmful to their
health. That the GGR involves restrictions on funding for abortion and
abortion counseling, as opposed to directly criminalizing those activities,
should not matter. As one scholar has suggested, "A refusal to fund is
merely another form of government cooptation." 20 7 Therefore, the GGR
not only is a contentious regulatory action but also would be constitution-
ally suspect under equal protection principles if it applied to U.S. women.
IV. Likely Unconstitutionality of the GGR Under the First
Amendment
Another reason that the GGR is controversial is that it likely would be
unconstitutional based on First Amendment grounds if the "Standard Pro-
vision" restrictions that are imposed on foreign NGOs were imposed on
domestically formed NGOs. The concept that organizations are free to
speak about and engage in association for the "advancement of [their own]
beliefs and ideas is embedded in U.S. democratic principles and has been
long upheld by the Supreme Court. '20 8 With the GGR, the government
the subset of indigent women. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (holding
that an indigent woman does not come within a category considered a suspect class). As
Professor Sunstein notes, "A statute that is addressed at women by plain terms is of
course a form of sex discrimination. A statute that involves a biological correlate of
being female should be treated in the same way." Sunstein, supra note 62, at 618.
203. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
204. Id. at 1641.
205. Id. at 1642 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (holding unconstitutional a ban on an abortion method that forced a woman to
terminate pregnancy by a more harmful method); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000) (providing that risk to a woman's health can arise from entirely barring
abortion).
206. See Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. at 1635-39.
207. Sunstein, supra note 62, at 620.
208. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (stating that "the government must abstain
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coercively controls and fully obstructs foreign NGOs' content-based speech
and related activities, punishing foreign NGOs that depart from a U.S. gov-
ernment-approved viewpoint.2 0 9 The United States holds itself up to the
world as a model democracy based on fundamental and equal rights for
individuals and organizations. Accompanying this role is the responsibil-
ity to permit abroad what must be permitted at home. As this Article will
demonstrate, recent case law is supportive.
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Eminent legal scholars have suggested courts' application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is hopelessly confused and confus-
ing.2 10 Professor Kathleen Sullivan has described the doctrine as provid-
ing that:
[G]overnment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that
benefit altogether.[ 2 11] It reflects the triumph of the view that government
may not do indirectly what it may not do directly over the view that the
greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condi-
tion on its receipt.
2 12
Professor Sullivan's comments reflect that embedded in the doctrine is a
concern that the government not be permitted to coerce an individual or
entity to surrender a constitutionally protected right. To be an unconstitu-
tional condition, however, the governmental condition need not be inher-
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspec-
tive of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction"). The Supreme Court has clearly
held that the government may not compel organizations or individuals to speak in a
content- or viewpoint-specific manner as a condition of participating in a government
program. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
209. Cf. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980).
210. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 5 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and
the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84, 102-04 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989).
211. A string of Supreme Court opinions have confirmed that the First Amendment
would be violated if the government were to deny a subsidy or other benefit to a person
or entity that infringes the person's or entity's First Amendment rights, even if the per-
son or entity "has no entitlement to the subsidy or benefit." See, e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs v.
Unberhr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the government would
financially support embryonic stem cell research, but he placed major restrictions on the
type of research that would be funded. Press Release, President Discusses Stem Cell
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
08/20010809-2.html. He limited eligibility for $250 million in government funding of
stem cell research to researchers who would utilize only then-available embryonic stem
cell lines. See id. President Bush did not prohibit eligible researchers from utilizing
their private funds for embryonic stem cell research from lines then not in existence. See
id. Under Supreme Court precedence, this funding restriction would not amount to an
unconstitutional condition. See infra notes 215-33 and accompanying text (discussing
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
212. Sullivan, supra note 210, at 1415.
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ently coercive. 213 Professor David Cole has explained:
[The doctrine] seeks to identify those conditions on funding that have a
coercive effect on the recipient's freedom to exercise her constitutional
rights on her own time and with her own resources .... Where the govern-
ment seeks to prohibit speech directly, the [F]irst [A]mendment demands
that it maintain neutrality toward content, viewpoint, and speaker identity.
This neutrality mandate is designed to curb government action that threat-
ens to skew the marketplace of ideas or to indoctrinate the citizenry.
Because government funding of speech raises similar concerns, the neutral-
ity mandate also has a role to play in reviewing government funding of
speech.
214
B. Right to Freedom of Speech
1. Rust v. Sullivan
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was at the core of the 1991
Supreme Court decision in Rust v. Sullivan,2 15 which involved a First
Amendment challenge by Title X private grantees to regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Health and Human Services. 2 16 The regula-
tions conditioned grantees' entitlement to Title X funding on their
refraining from providing abortion counseling and from directly or indi-
rectly encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion as a method of fam-
ily planning, including lobbying for legislation to increase its
availability. 2 17 The entitlement conditions were tied exclusively to Title X
monies and not to the manner in which a grantee utilized its own non-Title
funds.
2 18
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-justice majority, admitted
that their position "is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even
when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the
scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify
Government control over the content of expression. ' 2 19 Nonetheless, the
majority held that the regulations justifiably restricted the speech of grant-
ees without violating their First Amendment rights or those of their women
clients. 220 Drawing upon Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash-
ington,22 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that eligible grantees contin-
213. U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
214. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).
215. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
216. Id. at 173.
217. 42 CFR §§ 59.2, 59.8-10 (1989).
218. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
219. Id. at 199.
220. Id. at 203.
221. 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (finding that the prohibition against lobbying did not
impose an unconstitutional burden on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions to a
§ 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization and did not violate free speech rights under the First
Amendment because the organization could form a § 501(c)(4) affiliate for lobbying
purposes and, although that organization would not be entitled to tax-deductible contri-
butions, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause would not be violated).
619
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ued to have another avenue-their non-Title X funds-by which to perform
abortions, provide abortion counseling, and engage in abortion advocacy,
as long as objective indicia showed that those activities were conducted
separately and independently from the project that Title X monies sup-
ported. 22 2 He distinguished this case from "our 'unconstitutional condi-
tions' cases,"22 3 such as FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,22 4
explaining that the latter category of cases involved "situations in which
the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting
the recipient from engaging in the [First Amendment] protected conduct
outside the scope of the federally funded program.
2 25
Utilizing broad unconstitutional conditions language and other far-
reaching rhetoric,2 26 the majority rejected the claim that, by permitting the
anti-abortion acts and speech of other entities, the regulations impermissi-
bly discriminated against and chilled the speech of the group of organiza-
tions that present pro-abortion viewpoints. 22 7  Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged and reaffirmed the well-established principle that the gov-
ernment cannot "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as
to 'aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 2 28 He stated that there is a
distinction, however, between direct governmental interference in an organ-
ization's conduct with respect to a U.S. funded project and governmental
encouragement of alternative activity within a U.S. funded project.2 29 In
several subsequent statements, Justice Rehnquist strongly implied that the
government would have been constrained constitutionally under the First
Amendment from imposing the Title X eligibility restrictions on grantees
that, independent of the governmentally funded project, conduct full fam-
ily counseling programs, abortion referrals, and otherwise promote abor-
tion by utilizing non-governmental funds.
230
222. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(a) provided that "none of the
funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning." Id. 42 CFR § 59.9 (1991) required what the Supreme
Court referred to as "program integrity." Id. at 187.
223. Id. at 197.
224. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating federal law that barred noncommercial radio
and television stations receiving federal grants from editorializing because they could
not segregate their activities according to the sources of funding).
225. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)
(distinguishing Rust and concluding that attorney's First Amendment free speech and
expressive association rights were infringed by the funding restriction in the legal aid
statute because the legal aid services attorney had no nongovernmental source of finan-
cial support for consultation with clients).
226. See Cole, supra note 214, at 686-87.
227. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
228. Id. at 192 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. at
548 (1983)); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
229. Id. at 193 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977)).
230. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
The regulations prohibiting abortion counseling and referral are of the same ilk
[encouraging family planning within the intent of Title X]; "no funds appropri-
ated for the project may be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning," and a doctor employed by the project may be prohibited in the course
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The Rust majority clearly does not hold that the government can place
a condition on recipients of governmental subsidies that will infringe on
the recipients' First Amendment rights to act and speak outside of the par-
ticular governmentally funded program. 23 ' It also does not conclude that
the "selective subsidization of speech can never infringe the First Amend-
ment, nor that the government is free to impose any substantive speech
restrictions it chooses on the use of funds. '23 2 Rust does not support con-
straints on an organization's First Amendment speech and associational
rights where it has legal ability only to obtain governmental funding to
carry out its governmentally mandated mission.23 3
2. DKT International v. USAID and Alliance for Open Society
International v. USAID
Two recent U.S. district court cases, DKT International v. U.S. Agency
for International Development234 and Alliance for Open Society International
v. U.S. Agency for International Development,23 5 distinguished Rust.23 6
Both cases involved domestically incorporated NGOs that actively partici-
pate in international efforts to curtail the spread of HIV/AIDS. These
NGOs claimed that the eligibility requirement of 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f),
enacted as part of USLA, 23 7 for obtaining USAID funding for their work in
of his project duties from counseling abortion or referring for abortion. This is
not a case of the Government "suppressing a dangerous idea," but of a prohibi-
tion on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of
the project's scope [with Title X funds]."
Id. at 193-94. He further commented that in the current case the government refused
"to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of
the project funded." Id. at 194-95 (emphasis added). See also Cole, supra note 214, at
686 (asserting that the government should not be able to freely determine whatever
content-based or viewpoint-based restrictions it desires when designing funding
subsidies).
231. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98.
232. Cole, supra note 214, at 693.
233. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
234. 435 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006).
235. 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
236. Additionally, the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, a domestic NGO, filed
a lawsuit challenging the GGR on First Amendment grounds. Ctr. for Reprod. Law &
Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2002). Specifically, the suit alleged that the GGR
restrictions interfered with its right to lobby and globally promote abortion and that
foreign NGOs and governments were unwilling to associate with it for fear that the
United States would revoke their aid. Id. at 189. The Second Circuit dismissed all
claims, including the First Amendment claims without reaching the constitutional stand-
ing issue. Id. at 195. The Court found that Plaintiff alleged only indirect, abstract, and
conjectural harms and, therefore, did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for stand-
ing. Id. Furthermore, the Court held that the NGO's freedom of association was not
violated because foreign NGOs were free to associate with Plaintiff as long as they did
not receive U.S. funding. Id. 196-98. The Court found that this incidental effect on
Plaintiffs freedom to associate did not amount to a constitutional violation. Id.
237. See supra note 139. The overarching congressional purpose of USLA was to
"strengthen United States leadership and the effectiveness of the United States response
to" HIV/AIDS. 22 U.S.C. § 7603 (2003). The Act enables the president to establish
programs "to treat individuals infected with HIV/AIDS .... [and to] prevent the further
spread of HIV infections ...." Id. § 761 1(a)(1). Additionally, it provides that "the reduc-
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preventing, treating, and monitoring the spread of HIV/AIDS, was an
unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment rights. That stat-
utory provision prohibits the use of USLA funds by a recipient "to provide
assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explic-
itly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." In both cases, the NGOs
further challenged USAID's implementing policy. 238 Pursuant to USAID
Policy AAPD 05-04, eligibility is predicated on a recipient organization's
completion of a written certification by a Standard Provision that specifi-
cally confirms that the organization has a policy explicitly opposing prosti-
tution and sex trafficking. 2 3 9
In DKT International, DKT2 40 brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against USAID, constitutionally challenging the USLA stat-
ute and USAID's enforcement of the statutory provision pursuant to its Pol-
icy AAPD 05-04. Judge Emmet Sullivan held that, although Congress can
place limits on the manner in which recipients of governmental funds can
utilize those monies, the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not
tion of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks shall be a priority of all prevention efforts in terms of
funding, educational messages, and activities by promoting abstinence from sexual
activity and substance abuse, encouraging monogamy and faithfulness, promoting the
effective use of condoms, and eradicating prostitution, the sex trade, rape, sexual assault
and sexual exploitation of women and children." Id. § 7611(a)(4).
238. USAID AAPD 05-04 provides:
The U.S. Government is opposed to prostitution and related activities, which are
inherently harmful and dehumanizing, and contribute to the phenomenon of
trafficking in persons. None of the funds made available under this agreement
may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution
or sex trafficking....
Except as noted in the second sentence of this paragraph, as a condition of
entering into this agreement or any sub-agreement, a non-governmental organi-
zation or public international organization recipient/subrecipient must have a
policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. The following organi-
zations are exempt from this paragraph: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis and Malaria; the World Health Organization; the International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative; and any United Nations Agency.
USAID Office of Acquisition and Assistance, AAPD 05-04 Implementation of the United
States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria Act of 2003 - Eligibility
Limitation on the Use of Funds and Opposition to Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, at 5
(June 9, 2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business-opportunities/
cib/pdf/aapd05 04.pdf [hereinafter AAPD 05-04].
239. AAPD 05-04 requires all recipients of FY04-FY08 USLA funds to provide to the
USAID Agreement Officer a certification substantially as follows: "[Recipient's name]
certifies compliance as applicable with the standard provision entitled... "Prohibition
on the Promotion or Advocacy of the Legalization or Practice of Prostitution or Sex
Trafficking" included in the referenced agreement." Id. at 6.
240. DKT International is a qualified charity under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). DKT pro-
vides international family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention programs, and it receives
approximately 16% of its budget from USAID grants. See DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency
for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l II), 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The funds at issue
involve DKT's operations as a sub-grantee of Family Health International in Vietnam. Id.
The sub-agreement provided that the certification that DKT has a policy explicitly
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking "is an express term and condition of the agree-
ment." Id.
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give Congress unlimited power to impose restrictions. 24 1 Illustrating one
such impermissible limitation, he relied on Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Rust for the principle that the unconstitutional condition doctrine prevents
the government from prohibiting the recipient of a government subsidy
from engaging in speech and conduct protected under the First
Amendment. 24 2
Judge Sullivan proceeded to explain that by "mandating that DKT
adopt an organizational-wide policy against prostitution, the government
exceeds its ability to limit the use of government funds. The government
effectively is precluding DKT from taking any other position on the issue of
prostitution [e.g., neutral or for its legalization] in any other context, even
with wholly private funds. ' '243 The court found key that, unlike in Rust, a
domestic NGO seeking USLA funding could not adopt a policy other than
one explicitly denouncing prostitution and sex trafficking,2 44 not even a
neutral policy. 24 5 As a result, Judge Sullivan determined that 22 U.S.C.
§ 7631(f) and AAPD 05-04 were not tailored sufficiently narrowly to fur-
ther a compelling state interest in a specific project to which the govern-
ment contributed funds.24 6 Instead, he concluded, the scope of these
provisions impacted not only the specific USLA-funded program but also,
more broadly, the recipient's First Amendment protected speech and con-
duct outside that project.2 47 Judge Sullivan held, therefore, that the statu-
tory provision and the USAID "Standard Provision" certification
requirement could not survive constitutional scrutiny. 248 Rather, they con-
stituted inappropriate viewpoint-based restrictions on the domestic NGOs'
speech.249
On February 27, 2007, a three-judge panel of the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) overturned Judge Sullivan's deci-
sion.25 0 In essence, the circuit court interpreted Rust and other Supreme
Court precedents to constitutionally permit the government to restrain
potential private entity grantees' speech where the objective of the govern-
mentally subsidized program is to promote a legitimate governmental pol-
241. DKT Int'l v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14-15
(D.D.C. 2006), rev'd, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 209-10 (1987), the Court indicated that Congress can achieve through its spend-
ing power what it might not have power otherwise to do directly. Nonetheless, this does
not mean that Congress can exercise its spending power in a manner that contravenes
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
242. DKT Int'l 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16.
243. Id. at 16.
244. The statute and the USAID policy do not permit adoption of a policy either that
is neutral or favorable toward prostitution and sex trafficking. Id.
245. See id.
246. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); DKT Int'l 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 16-17.
247. See DKT Int'l 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 17.
248. See id. at 18.
249. See id. at 17.
250. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l II), 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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icy rather than to encourage a private entity's own speech. 25 1 In this
regard, the D.C. Circuit noted that a primary policy objective of the govern-
ment in adopting USLA was to reduce HIV/AIDS behavioral risks, includ-
ing prostitution, and that a grant issued under USLA constitutes a subsidy
to a spokesperson for the government. 2 52 Therefore, the circuit court held
that the government constitutionally can compel its agent, here considered
by the court to be DKT, to "communicate a particular viewpoint ... and
require those agents not to convey contrary messages. '25 3 The D.C. Circuit
stated that constraining agents' private speech to ensure the clarity of the
government's message is particularly important "on matters with foreign
policy implications. ' 25 4 The circuit court further suggested that if DKT
does not want to embrace the government's anti-prostitution policy and
comply with the certification procedure, DKT has an alternative: the forma-
tion of a separate subsidiary that itself would adopt a certifiable policy
opposing prostitution and thus could qualify as a potential grant recipient
under USLA. 25 5 According to the court, such a structure would not com-
pel DKT itself to advocate the government's position, and therefore, there
would be no unconstitutional infringement of DKT's free speech rights.
Several days before Judge Sullivan released his opinion in DKT Interna-
tional, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
released its opinion in Alliance for Open Society International.2 56 In that
case, the plaintiffs included three separate domestically incorporated non-
profit entities, Open Society International (OSI), a private foundation, Alli-
ance for Open Society International (AOSI), an affiliate of OSI, and
Pathfinder International (Pathfinder), which operates internationally. 25 7
AOSI sought clarification of the certification requirements of the USAID
policy; all three requested a preliminary injunction against USAID's
enforcement of its "Standard Provision" requirement for eligibility and
sought a preliminary injunction barring the Government from discontinu-
ing their funding based on enforcement of 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) and AAPD
05-04.258 OSI claimed that the statute and USAID policy compelled it to
monitor its own speech for fear of endangering AOSI.25 9 AOSI asserted
that USAID's policy requirements violated its internal governance rules,
compelled it to engage in speech against its will, forced it to monitor its
speech, and coerced it into refraining from certain activities financed only
251. Id. at 761-62 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Rust v. Sulli-
van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
252. Id. at 760; see also supra note 237.
253. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l II), 477 F.3d 758, 762
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 763 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983)).
256. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int' I v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
257. Id. at 230.
258. Id. at 237-39.
259. Id. at 238.
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by its private funds. 2 60 Pathfinder alleged that compliance with USAID
policy forced it to avoid utilizing its private funding to advocate legal
reforms in Brazil and India. 26 1
Judge Victor Marrero viewed the court's task as one of "determining
where in the murky borderlands between Congress's Spending Clause
power and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine the instant case
lies."'262 Using a heightened scrutiny standard of review for injunctive
relief,2 63 he concluded that "in the instant case, the Court is persuaded
that [the Government's] interpretation of the statute [AAPD 05-04] as
applied to Plaintiffs' privately funded speech activities falls squarely
beyond what the Supreme Court has permitted to date as conditions of
government financing."2 64 Judge Marrero rejected the notion that govern-
mental conditions on public benefits must be inherently coercive to consti-
tute an impermissible burden on constitutional rights.2 65 He asserted
instead that it is the systemic burden and effect of the governmentally
imposed condition that must be the central foCUS. 2 6 6 In support of this
proposition, Judge Marrero noted that the protective role of the First
Amendment is the maintenance of an appropriate and balanced power rela-
tionship between a strong government "entrusted with vast resources '26 7
and the people whose free speech and choice rights, whether in accord or
discord with the government, must be safeguarded against governmental
overreach. 268 He summarized this perspective by stating:
In sum, the government should not throw its immense delegated weight into
the public arena through strategies and means that improperly arrogate or
shift public power, in particular when the net consequence may be to pro-
mote the government's own view at the expense of other perspectives, to
distort political ties as between the state and each individual, or to upset the
societal standings of particular individuals or groups relative to one another.
In this context, conditions on receipt of government funds, even if recipients
remain free to accept or reject the grants, become constitutionally suspect,
and demand enhanced scrutiny, if the purpose or effect of the allocation of
the public resources and benefits would substantially alter choice of private
speech and materially disrupt the power equilibrium of which the First
Amendment functions as centerpoint.
2 69
260. Id.
261. Id. at 238-39.
262. Id. at 254-55.
263. See id. at 260. Judge Marrero determined that the statute's effect on interna-
tional affairs does not provide a basis for applying a rational basis standard of review.
Id. at 265-67.
264. See id. at 239.
265. Id. at 256.
266. See id. at 257.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 257-58. Judge Marrero states, "For the so-called 'marketplace of ideas'
that is vital for a free society to function properly and to flourish, sustaining the people-
to-government power equilibrium as constitutionally calibrated demands a number of
checks long recognized in First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 258.
269. Id. at 258.
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Judge Marrero determined that, contrary to those government restric-
tions that the Supreme Court had held as constitutionally permissible,
2 70
the government's power disequilibrium resulting from 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f)
and AAOD 04-05 completely altered the choice of private speech by AOSI
and Pathfinder. 2 7 1 Eligibility for government funding absolutely precluded
a grantee from utilizing its private funds to engage in protected expression
through unregulated alternative activities. 27 2 A grantee had no means of
disseminating information of its choice, advocating its positions on mat-
ters of public concern, and engaging in other non-governmentally funded
activities on controversial issues.273 These communication activities "rest
on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."
27 4
Judge Marrero found cavalier the Government's argument of its entitle-
ment to adopt a policy that compels Plaintiffs' speech to exclusively
espouse the government's preferred message and therefore act as de facto
mouthpieces for the government's viewpoint. 275 He considered trouble-
some the Government's notion that its interest in disseminating a particu-
lar ideology, "no matter how acceptable to some,"2 76 should outweigh
organizations' First Amendment rights to avoid "becoming the courier for
such message. '2 77 He shunned the Government's position that Plaintiffs'
ability to decline government aid precludes their claim of compulsion to
advocate a government stance.2 78 Judge Marrero noted that even though
the policy at issue arises out of a Spending Clause enactment and therefore
does not constitute a direct regulation of speech, the Supreme Court estab-
lished an overriding principle "in keeping with the expectations our soci-
ety derives from First Amendment freedoms and how government would
respond to their invocation. ' 279 That tenet provides that "the government
cannot compel speech in exchange for participation in a government pro-
gram, even a program to which there is no direct entitlement."2 80 Conse-
quently, he concluded the statute and the Standard Provision undermined
this nation's democratic principles and constitutionally guaranteed
liberties.2 8 1
270. Judge Marrero reviewed numerous cases, including Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), and Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). See Alliance for Open
Soc'y Int'l, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 258-61.
271. See Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
272. Id. at 274-76.
273. Id. at 261-62.
274. Id. at 262 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 893
(1982)).
275. Id. at 274-76.
276. Id. at 276.
277. Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)). The court consid-
ered the Government's position of special concern because it would strengthen NGOs
willing to convey the government's viewpoint over those unwilling to do so. See id.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 275.
280. Id.
281. See id.
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Judge Marrero further concluded that the statutory and policy condi-
tion impermissibly discriminated against organizations "that may have
qualms over endorsing the government's viewpoint or encounter other
risks to their private use of such [non-government] funds"'2 82 but "[alt the
same time, the condition would favor organizations that conceptually sup-
ported the government's position, have no private funds to put in jeopardy
or otherwise do not have the financial or programmatic strength to resist
the government's inducement. '28 3 Based on these irreparable harms that
would result to AOSI and Pathfinder absent injunctive relief, Judge Marrero
entered a preliminary injunction enjoining .the government from enforcing
as an eligibility requirement under 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) that NGOs have a
policy "explicitly opposing prostitution. "284 Moreover, the government
agencies cannot terminate, suspend, refuse to enter into, or deny funding
under any direct or indirect grant, cooperative agreement, or contract with
Pathfinder, AOSI, or another entity that provides funding to these two
organizations.
2 85
C. Right to Freedom of Expressive Association
The fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is "to protect pri-
vate expression. ' 28 6 Nonetheless, whether private organizations have a
right of freedom of association with one another is unclear.28 7 The long
history of Supreme Court First Amendment decisions is based on the
rights of individuals 28 8 and of organizations themselves.2 89 Although the
Supreme Court has recognized that expressive associational rights extend
to several membership organizations to ensure the exercise of freedom of
expression between such organizations and their members, 2 90 it has not
specifically applied this protection among several non-membership organi-
zations. 29 1 Thus, the Supreme Court has not ruled on non-membership-
based NGOs' right of freedom of expressive association. The question has
come before the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of
282. Id. at 261.
283. Id. at 261, 276.
284. See id. at 229.
285. See id. at 237, 278.
286. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 700 (1970). See also U.S. v.
Am. Library Assoc., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 140 n. 7 (1973).
287. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 541 (2007).
288. See id.
289. See e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (confirming that
the Boy Scouts organization itself has the First Amendment right of expressive
association).
290. See, e.g., id. (protecting right of expressive associations to control own member-
ship and membership criteria); Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 367 (1988) (recogniz-
ing, in a case where union members asserted rights to associate together to conduct a
strike, that the right of association "encompasses the combination of individual workers
together in order better to assert their lawful rights"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (holding right to engage in litigation project by NAACP on behalf of its member-
ship is a constitutional right of "political association").
291. See Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
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In Pathfinder Fund v. U.S. Agency for International Development,293
three domestic NGOs contended that the GGR infringed their First Amend-
ment rights of association by effectively preventing them from associating
with foreign NGOs on abortion-related family planning projects. 294 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that the First
Amendment protects "two distinct concepts, the right to 'enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships' called 'freedom of intimate
association,' and the right to 'associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment - speech, assembly, petition
for redress of grievances .... called 'freedom of expressive association.
295
In applying the right of expressive association to the domestic NGOs'
claim, the court determined that there must be a "substantial interference"
of such right for a constitutional violation.2 96 Because under the GGR as
applicable to domestic NGOs, domestic NGOs could utilize their own
funds to engage in abortion-related family planning projects with foreign
NGOs, the court found no violation of the right of expressive associa-
tion.2 9 7 The court's analysis implies that had the government prohibited
these non-membership organizations from utilizing their own private funds
to engage in abortion-related activities, their First Amendment right of
expressive association would have been violated.2 98
In DKT Memorial Fund Ltd v. U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment,29 9 the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court has not
yet extended to multiple organizations the right to associate in order to
engage in constitutionally protected activities. 30 0 Nonetheless, the court
"assume[d] for purposes of this opinion that the combination of the NGOs
in the ... [abortion-related family planning] project is entitled to freedom
of association." 30 1 The court concluded that the GGR applicable to domes-
tic NGOs, which prohibits the use of governmental funds but not private
funds for separate abortion-related activities, did not infringe rights of
association. The court reasoned that the GGR's "restriction on subgranting
creates no obstacle in the way of DKT's association with the FNGOs [for-
eign NGOs] that would not be there absent the existence of the grant pro-
gram in the first place."'3 0 2 In other words, without government aid, the
domestic NGO could engage in an abortion-related family planning project
with foreign NGOs by utilizing its own money; with government aid, the
292. See Pathfinder Fund v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 746 F. Supp. 192 (1990); DKT
Mem'l Fund Ltd v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (1989).
293. See Pathfinder Fund, 746 F. Supp. 192.
294. See id. at 193.
295. Id. at 194.
296. Id. at 195-96 (explaining that a "slight" burden on the right of association
would not infringe the U.S. Constitution).
297. Id. at 199.
298. See id. at 196, 199.
299. 887 F.2d 275 (1989).
300. Id. at 292.
301. Id.
302. Id.
Vol. 40
2007 Global Gag Rule
domestic NGO could conduct such a project utilizing exclusively funds
from non-governmental sources.
D. How Foreign NGOs Would Likely Fare Under Constitutional
Principles
1. Freedom of Speech
The GGR implemented by the current Standard Provision predicates
eligibility of a foreign NGO for U.S. family planning aid on such NGO
refraining from all abortion-related counseling and referrals, as well as lob-
bying, whether for or against abortion rights, even if funded solely by non-
U.S. government sources. 30 3 Certainly, under the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority in
Rust, such conditions if applied to a domestic NGO would involve "situa-
tions in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of
the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the [First Amendment] protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program."30 4 As in DKT
International,30 5 the government is not merely suppressing "dangerous
ideas," but is essentially banning foreign NGOs from "taking any ... posi-
tion on the issue of ... [abortion] in any . . .context, even with wholly
private funds,"30 6 an act that the federal district court found to violate the
free speech rights of a domestic NGO. The Supreme Court long ago noted
that "constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,'
effect of governmental [acts even if they] . . .fall short of a direct prohibi-
tion against the exercise of First Amendment rights."30 7 Certainly, if the
GGR's funding eligibility requirements do not constitute a direct proscrip-
tion on a foreign NGO's exercise of its chosen speech, the government's
effective ban on such NGO's ability to counsel about abortion, make abor-
tion referrals, or otherwise assert a position on abortion far exceeds this
accepted standard.
Additionally, for several reasons, the D.C. Circuit's justifications for its
holding in DKT International unquestionably clash with this recognized
standard. Its interpretation of Supreme Court precedents, including Rust,
to entitle the government to treat private entity grantees and sub-grantees
as its agents and to restrain their speech if the governmentally-funded pro-
gram's objective is other than encouraging private speech is unduly broad.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rust is considerably narrower
and does not make such a claim. That opinion does not hold the govern-
ment constitutionally free to impose a restraint on the private speech of an
eligible recipient of a government subsidy where that private speech relates
303. See USAID, MANDATORY STANDARD PROVISIONS FOR NON-U.S., NONGOVERNMENTAL
RECIPIENTS 19 (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/3OO/303mab.pdf.
304. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991).
305. See supra note 240-49 and accompanying text.
306. DKT Int'l v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 16
(D.D.C. 2006), rev'd, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
307. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
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to its own activities funded from non-governmental sources. 308 That the
D.C. Circuit in DKT International ignores the governmental scheme requir-
ing DKT to adopt an organization-wide policy against prostitution amounts
to coercive restraint on DKT's ability either to be silent or to state a neutral
position on prostitution and, accordingly, to offer non-governmental pro-
grams consistent with that position where funded exclusively by private
sources. If DKT were to assume such an organization-wide silent or neutral
stance and use private funds to help prostitutes obtain condoms for family
planning and the prevention of HIV/AIDS, certainly it would not be operat-
ing inconsistently with USLA's objectives. 30 9 Unquestionably, the govern-
ment is exercising power over the organization in a way that cannot solve
prostitution, sexual exploitation, or HIV/AIDS.
Furthermore, the circuit court's suggestion that DKT itself maintain a
neutral policy regarding prostitution but form a wholly-owned subsidiary
that explicitly opposes prostitution to receive and utilize USAID funds can-
not adequately remedy the effect of such coercive power.3 10 As noted in
Appellee's brief,3 1 1 contrary to a lesson of West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette,3 12 such a maneuver amounts to the government doing indi-
rectly what it cannot do directly. Surely Rust and Barnette prohibit the
government from coercing DKT itself to adopt an anti-prostitution policy to
obtain USLA funding and from compelling DKT to form a separate subsidi-
ary to obtain such funding. And, contrary to that which Rust holds accept-
able,3 13 wouldn't the necessity of establishing such a subsidiary be an
admission by the government that USLA places an unconstitutional
restraint on a parent entity, an otherwise eligible recipient of a subsidy, that
has private resources and seeks only to supplement its privately-funded
projects with government-funded projects? Finally, it is not financially or
otherwise costless to form such a subsidiary. 3 14 It would place DKT in a
position of being perceived by its clients, other entities, and foreign govern-
308. See supra notes 215-33 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 237-38 and accompanying text.
310. See DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. (DKT Int'l II), 477 F.3d 758, 763
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
311. Brief for Appellee, DKT Int'l I, 477 F.3d 758 (No. 06-5225).
312. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
313. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly
states in Rust that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits "situations in
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from
engaging in the [First Amendment] protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program." 500 U.S. at 197.
314. The plurality of the Supreme Court, in a portion of its decision written by Justice
Roberts and joined by Justice Alito, recently admitted in the context of "electioneering
communications" under section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
that "well-documented and onerous burdens, particularly on small nonprofits" make it
unreasonable to require a § 501(c)(4) organization to form and utilize a separate "PAC
[political action committee] alternative" to engage in speech constitutionally protected
by the First Amendment. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2671 n.9 (2007). So too, in the context of the GGR, the formation of an alterna-
tive subsidiary imposes "well-documented and onerous burdens, particularly on small
nonprofits."
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ments as hypocritical and disingenuous, perhaps ultimately resulting in its
inability altogether to engage in all family planning and HIV/AIDS preven-
tion activities abroad. Therefore, the USLA certification requirement is a
restraint on the private speech of DKT that substantially penalizes DKT. A
less restrictive constitutional alternative exists to the requisite organization-
wide anti-prostitution certification: permitting a potential recipient either
to be silent or to adopt a neutral policy. The infirmities of the circuit
court's opinion in DKT International are numerous and significant. They
clearly demonstrate that the opinion cannot be relied on as legitimate sup-
port for the government's GGR stance.
Applying Judge Marrero's analysis in Alliance for Open Society Interna-
tional,3 15 if the government's interpretation of 22 U.S.C. § 2151b were
applied to privately funded speech activities of domestic NGOs, it would
fall "squarely beyond what the Supreme Court has permitted to date as
conditions of government financing."3 1 6 As Judge Marrero noted, govern-
mental conditions on public benefits need not be inherently coercive to
constitute an impermissible burden on domestic NGO's constitutional
rights.3 17 Focusing on the systemic burden and effect of the governmen-
tally imposed conditions, the government's power disequilibrium resulting
from the statute, USAID interpretations, and the absolute alteration of the
choice of private speech, it appears that under Judge Marrero's analysis, the
GGR as applied to foreign NGOs would be considered unconstitutional if
domestic NGOs were subjected to the same eligibility conditions. As a con-
sequence, the GGR inappropriately holds foreign NGOs to a "higher" stan-
dard than domestic NGOs. This discrepancy both undermines
fundamental constitutional values that the United States seeks to promote
worldwide and to have other countries adopt, and it presents the United
States as two-faced.
2. Freedom of Association
Crucial in both DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. and Pathfinder Fund is the
possibility that non-membership organizations may indeed have a right of
expressive association and that, pursuant to the GGR, domestic NGOs
could utilize private financial resources, but not U.S. government aid, to
pursue abortion-related family planning projects. There is no such possi-
bility under the GGR as it applies to foreign NGOs. To be eligible to receive
U.S. assistance under the GGR as set forth in the Standard Provision, a
foreign NGO must certify that it does not engage in abortion-related activi-
ties, whether utilizing its own funds or U.S. aid. Because there is no alter-
native means to engage in abortion-related expressive conduct, this
requirement is a "substantial infringement" on such activities by foreign
NGOs.
315. See supra notes 256-85 and accompanying text.
316. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int' l v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222,
239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
317. Id. at 256 (relying on U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968)).
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Assuming that domestic NGOs have expressive associational rights
under the First Amendment, such an eligibility standard would unconstitu-
tionally infringe those rights. This result is particularly bad for the United
States' image because it appears that the country is hypocritical in its
notions of democracy, applying one standard to domestic NGOs and
another to foreign NGOs engaging in the same abortion-related activities.
If the U.S. Constitution is truly to embody freedom of speech and associa-
tion as overriding values that must be guaranteed, rather than as mere
inconvenient constitutional technicalities to be accommodated, this dis-
crepant treatment cannot be permitted. These fundamentally valued rights
should be promoted worldwide and should not be evaded outside our terri-
torial boundaries.
Conclusion
Although the U.S. government was in no sense founded upon any
religion, the electorate expects foreign policymakers to rely on basic moral
principles, including fundamental Judeo-Christian precepts, when design-
ing and effectuating foreign policy and foreign assistance policy. American
foreign policies that are not true to the best U.S. traditions adopted from
Judeo-Christian mores, however, have little support at home and little cred-
ibility abroad. 31 8 Thus, abusing voters' appropriate expectations, the for-
eign policy architects of the GGR unwisely disregarded these basic moral
values. The GGR is purely a product of politicians' imprudently legislating
their excessively moralistic attitudes and unpardonable self-indulged
power, and it is a toxic symbol of their allegiance to the select constituency
of the Religious Right over the majority of U.S. voters.
The GGR has a ghastly impact on the personal lives of the residents of
foreign nations. It denigrates women's inherent right to dignity and denies
women's inviolability, is bereft of ethical benefit, and is incompatible with
universally accepted ideals that our nation's foreign assistance policy must
embrace. It co-opts foreign women's bodies to serve U.S. politicians' self-
interests, which, if imposed on U.S. women, arguably would be unconstitu-
tional under equal protection principles.
Also, unsatisfactory public health conditions in developing countries
underlie the conclusion that the GGR does not appropriately serve U.S.
national interests. Reports show that the GGR has created major interna-
tional public health problems. It has compromised women's health and
welfare by denying access to legal abortions. It has been associated with a
failure to reduce the market for and the harm caused by illegal abortions in
foreign countries. Additionally, its universal application to USAID popula-
tion planning and health programs has resulted in adverse health impacts
to victims of HIV/AIDS. Absent the GGR, many collective benefits could
have accrued to our nation and our citizens from opportunities to improve
318. Robert J. Myers, The Carnegie Poll on Values in American Foreign Policy, 3 Emics
& INT'L. AFF. 297, 299 (1989).
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health abroad and to enhance and stabilize educational, economic, politi-
cal, labor, and environmental conditions in developing countries.
In addition to the unconscionable human tolls abroad, the GGR detri-
mentally and unfairly has affected foreign NGOs and inexcusably tar-
nished America's positive image abroad. The GGR actually restricts
political advocacy and civil participation by foreign NGOs, contrary to
America's basic notions of democratic processes, 3 19 and, in reality, it
imposes limitations and higher standards on foreign NGOs than likely
could be constitutionally inflicted on domestic NGOs in similar posi-
tions. 3 20 This variation in standards and constraints raises conceptual and
real problems. Of great importance, the disparity appears hypocritical to
the world and calls into question the legitimacy of U.S. values and ideals.
Moreover, documentation shows that the GGR strictures not only have
jeopardized the missions but also the very existence of numerous foreign
NGOs that have sought to better the health and welfare of foreign coun-
tries' residents. These notable results of the GGR have caused significant
damage to the respect that foreign individuals, NGOs, and governments
have for the United States. This policy is an inexcusable international sym-
bol of the spoiling of a positive U.S. image abroad. Installation in January
2007 of new Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and
Senate provides Congress with an opportunity to legislatively reject the
executive-based GGR. 32 1 Such congressional action would benefit foreign
individuals and NGOs and would promote U.S. national interests.
319. Indeed, one can argue that the GGR is a symbol of the rise, once again in the
history of the United States, of the wealth of particular religious bodies and encroach-
ment of religious groups into private rights of conscience and democratic processes
through alliances with governmental officials.
320. See Skuster, supra note 105, at 100. See supra Parts IV.D.1-2.
321. On January 22, 2007, the sixth anniversary of President Bush's reinstatement of
the GGR, Representatives Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Christopher Shays (R-CT) introduced
a bill to overturn the policy. On May 3, 2007, President Bush warned that he would veto
any such legislation. See Bush Threatens Veto Over Any Abortion Rights Measure, NAT'L J.
CONG. DAILY, May 4, 2007.

